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Abstract 
This paper describes the evolution of the legislative powers 
in Italy after the constitutional reform of Title V and, in particular, 
in the decade that followed. Constitutional Law no. 3 of 2001 
sought to amend the Constitution so as to provide greater 
legislative autonomy to the Italian regions; for this reason, it 
reversed the criteria for the distribution of legislative powers, and 
provided a residual clause whereby all matters not expressly 
provided for in Art. 117, par. 2 and 3, should be considered to 
belong to the full legislative competence of the Regions. In the 
next ten years the Constitutional Court was called to offer a 
reading of the new reach of legislative powers. The result is a 
structure of powers which is quite different from that envisaged 
by Art. 117 of the Constitution. The study outlines the 
characteristic features emerging from an analysis of the decisions 
of the Constitutional Court as to each type of legislative powers 
(exclusive, concurrent and residual) and the main legislative 
matters. It also describes the main models and tools used to 
harmonize the expressed purpose of legislation. 
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1. Factual assumptions and jurisprudential evolution 
1.1 Premise. Delineating the extent of the investigation 
This study describes how the framework of legislative 
powers in Italy has evolved due to the constitutional amendment 
of Title V.  
It should be noted right at the start that state and regional 
legislative powers in Italy are inevitably intertwined with the 
history of its regions (special statute regions to start with, ordinary 
regions to follow) and with the slow, continuous evolution of 
Italian regionalism. 
The factors that have determined the rather difficult 
constitution of a credible regional state since 1948, at various 
levels (political, legislative, administrative, and financial) are 
diverse, and have been effective at different times in the 
constitutional history of the country. 
As a matter of fact, the «regional issue» is deeply rooted in 
the ways in which the unification of Italy (whose 150th anniversary 
was celebrated in 2011) was pursued, achieved and implemented 
by the liberal state. 
In order to fully understand the complex issues the 
constitutional reform has tried to address, the juridical analysis 
offered below needs prefacing with a detailed description of the 
evolution of the Italian regional system spanning the twenty years 
from the strenuous effort in making up the regions1 during the 
constituent assembly, through the laying out of an implicitly 
ambiguous (especially as far as the legislative power granted to 
the regions2 is concerned) Constitutional Charter in 1948, to the 
delayed provisions relating to the establishment of ordinary 
regions3 in the late ‘60s. 
The preface should be complemented with a close juridical 
analysis of the legislative powers distributed between State and 
                                                           
1 Further details on the topic are available in E. Rotelli, L’avvento della Regione in 
Italia (1943-1947) ( 1967). 
2 For an in-depth study, refer to: V. Crisafulli, La legge regionale nel sistema delle 
fonti, in Riv. trim. dir. pubbl. 262 et seq. (1960); L. Paladin, Problemi legislativi e 
interpretativi nella definizione delle materie di competenza regionale, in 1 Foro amm. 3 
et seq. (1971); S. Bartole, Supremazia e collaborazione nei rapporti tra Stato e Regioni, 
in 1 Riv. trim. dir. pubbl. 84 et seq. (1971); A. D’Atena, Legge regionale (e 
provinciale) in Enc. dir., XXIII (1973), 969 et seq. 
3 A detailed analysis of these issues is offered in L. Paladin, Diritto regionale 
(1992); E. Spagna Musso, Diritto regionale (1992). 
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regions in the thirty years from the effective implementation of the 
ordinary regions to the (third) Constitutional Law of 20014.  
However, only a short list of what cannot be discussed 
here5 is provided in order to point out that the amendment of Title 
V has not devised Italian regionalism «from scratch». Many of the 
developments that followed the amendment can only be 
explained on the ground of the burden placed by the former 
institutional evolution onto the state-regions relationship as 
redesigned by the constitutional reforms in the years between 
1999 and 2001. In this article we will discuss what has happened 
since 2001. 
Also in this respect, it should be pointed out that the article 
will only incidentally discuss the growing role of the impact of EU 
legislation on state law – partly due to the new wording of Const. 
Art. 117, par. 16 – and its consequences in the relationship between 
State and regional legislation, as it would deserve a 
comprehensive analysis that we cannot carry out here7. 
 
 
1.2. The amendment to Title V and the new framework of 
legislative powers 
What Constitutional Law (CL) No. 3 of 2001 deliberately 
intended to do when it amended the whole Title V of the 
Constitution (Articles 114 through 133) – along with the previous 
CL, No. 1 of 1999 – was to redefine the system of relationships 
                                                           
4 A detailed analysis of the topic is provided in R. Bin, Legge regionale, in A. 
Barbera, L. Califano (ed.), Saggi e materiali di diritto regionale (1997), 59 et seq. 
Further remarks on the several attempts at amending the constitution are 
available in C. Fusaro, La redistribuzione territoriale del potere politico nel dibattito 
parlamentare dalla Commissione Bozzi alla Commissione D’Alema (1983-1998), in S. 
Gambino (ed.), Stati nazionali e poteri locali (1998), 493 et seq. 
5 An in-depth study is offered in S. Calzolaio, La legge regionale fra materie e 
competenze (2008). 
6 See A. Barbera, Corte costituzionale e giudici di fronte ai "vincoli comunitari": una 
ridefinizione dei confini?, in 2 Quad. cost. 335 et seq. (2007); for a broader 
perspective, see A. Ruggeri, Rapporti fra fonti europee e fonti nazionali, in P. 
Costanzo, L. Mezzetti, A. Ruggeri (ed.), Lineamenti di diritto costituzionale 
dell’Unione europea (2008), 285 et seq.  
7 For further details, see P. Zuddas, L’influenza del diritto dell’Unione Europea sul 
riparto di competenze legislative tra Stato e Regioni (2010). 
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between State and territorial authorities, specifically between State 
and regions.  
It should be noted, in a comparative perspective, that the 
underlying reasons that make the relationship between State and 
Regions rather unstable and in need of continual adjustments also 
in terms of constitutional norms, are common to almost all 
decentralized systems8. 
Space constraints will not allow us to discuss the quantity 
and quality of the amended provisions at length, but for those 
aspects which more directly affect the system of legislative 
powers. However, to provide a brief overview of the 
Constitutional Reform (or, if you wish, of the overambitious 
underlying reforming intent), it will suffice to compare the 
different formulation of Const. Art. 114, par. 1, which reads “The 
Republic is divided into Regions, Provinces, Municipalities” in the 
Constitution of 1948, with the amended version (in force) 
suggesting a more emphatic approach: “The Republic is composed of 
Municipalities, Provinces, Metropolitan Cities, Regions and the State”9. 
Apparently, the former implies a simplistic framework of 
territorial subdivision of the Republic – this term being used as a 
synonym for «State». The latter clearly separates the concept of 
«State» from the concept of «Republic», considering that this is 
seen as consisting of all territorial authorities, including the State. 
In this perspective, all territorial authorities – from 
municipalities to the state – are claimed to be deliberately brought 
onto the same level of formal and substantial equality.  
The provision that draws our attention most – i.e. Const. 
Art. 117 – further develops this claim and extends it to the exercise 
of legislative powers while following the framework introduced 
by the so-called « Bassanini Law»10. 
                                                           
8 For further remarks, see A. D’Atena (ed.), I cantieri del federalismo in Europa 
(2008), and P. Bilancia, Stato federale, unitario, regionale: dalle diverse origini storiche 
alla confluenza dei modelli, in Scritti in memoria di L. Paladin (2004), 269 et seq. 
On the evolution and development of Federalism in the U.S., see the recent C. 
Bologna, Stato federale e “National interest”. Le istanze unitarie nell’esperienza 
statunitense (2010). 
9 Further information on this topic is available in A. Barbera, Dal "triangolo 
tedesco" al "pentagono italiano", in 1 Quad. Cost. 85 et seq. (2002). 
10 Reference is made to Act No. 59 of 1997, adopted with the intent to complete 
the devolution of administrative powers from State to regions and local 
authorities (it is, in fact, the 3rd body of laws concerning the devolution of 
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The first paragraph of the provision applies restrictions to 
the legislation as such (whether state or regional) – which appears 
to be big news (it notably tended to achieve regulatory equality 
between state and regional lawmakers) if compared with the past 
formulation, which placed limits on the regional lawmaker only: 
“Legislative powers shall be vested in the State and the Regions in 
compliance with the Constitution and with the constraints deriving from 
EU legislation and international obligations”11.  
The subsequent paragraphs contribute to identify the three 
types of legislative powers that are being exercised, at least 
formally: exclusive powers (i.e. the list of subject matters on which 
only the state can legislate: Art. 117, par. 2), concurrent powers (i.e. 
the list of subject matters for which – based on the old Art. 117 – 
the State will enforce the fundamental principles, while the 
Regions will enforce the implementation rules: Art. 117, par. 3); 
residual powers (which do not refer to any list of subject matters, 
but are based on the «residual policy», according to which all 
subject matters that are not enumerated or provided for in the 
former lists fall within the Regions’ full legislative powers: Art. 
117, par. 4). 
A formal survey of legislative powers would therefore 
report the State as only having legislative authority over those 
subject matters which are expressly related to its exclusive 
powers, or referring to the fundamental principles in matters 
under concurrent powers. 
The residual policy is called upon in all other subject 
matters that are not enumerated; over these the Regions acquire 
                                                                                                                                              
powers, following the first two in the ‘70s). What is of interest here is that the 
real novelty introduced by the law consisted in the method for devolving 
powers, since the traditional criterion of distribution of powers and duties 
between the state, on one side, and the regions and local authorities, on the 
other, was subverted: in short, Bassanini Law provided the legal framework by 
which the state was to maintain its administrative powers over a definite set of 
enumerated matters while the remaining matters were to be granted to other 
local authorities through appropriate decrees. 
11 For further details on the analysis of the limitations deriving from the EU 
system and international obligations, refer to E. Baroncini’s contributions, La 
fonte internazionale and La fonte dell’Unione europea, in L.Califano (ed.), La 
costruzione giurisprudenziale delle fonti del diritto (2010). 
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general jurisdiction, as they are vested with legislative powers12: 
the state and regional legislative roles therefore seem to have been 
inverted if compared to the past formulation of art. 117. The 
regional lawmaker is granted general powers, in full or in part, 
over those subject matters which have not been reserved 
specifically for the State, as per Art. 117, par.  2 and 3. 
The entire system of state and regional legislative powers is 
consequently found to be based exclusively on the principle of the 
separation of powers, in accordance with the «legislative matters» 
assigned (or denied). 
 
 
1.3. The exercise of legislative powers. Introduction to a 
complex system. 
The exercise of legislative powers is much more complex 
than it may appear from the short description above. 
This complexity stems from a combination of factors, the 
first of which is represented by the «legislative matter» definition 
framework adopted in Art. 117. 
The first thing that can be noted while going through the 
lists contained therein is that the enumeration method of the 
legislative subject matters in the new Art. 117 is not unambiguous: 
it spans from objective identification (e.g. defense and armed 
forces: Art. 117, par. 2, letter d) to teleological identification (e.g. 
environmental protection: letter s). 
In the former case, the subject matter implies legislative 
powers generally referring to a certain subject: e.g. the State is 
granted legislative authority on matters of «weights and 
                                                           
12 The distribution of powers provided for in Art. 117 is to a great extent neither 
necessarily «fixed» nor immutable. Const. Art. 116, par. 3, specifies that “other 
forms of self-government and special conditions of implementation, concerning” 
matters of concurrent powers and matters of exclusive state powers (such as the 
protection of the environment, ecosystem and cultural heritage) “may be 
granted” to “Regions, by means of state laws, on the initiative of the interested region, 
after consulting the local authorities, and in compliance with the principles mentioned 
in Art. 119”. The law is approved if the “absolute majority of the members” in both 
branches of the Parliament is achieved and a preliminary agreement between 
the state and the region involved has been reached. More on the topic in A. 
Morrone, Il regionalismo differenziato. Commento all’art. 116, comma 3, della 
Costituzione, in 1 Fed. Fisc. 139 et seq. (2007).  
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measures, standard time» (letter r). The Regions will therefore not 
be allowed to make laws on any of those subjects. 
In the latter case, on the contrary, legislative powers are not 
granted mainly with reference to a certain subject, but especially 
with reference to a certain scope (which relates to a certain 
subject). 
The state has legislative powers over «protection of cultural 
heritage»; however, its powers do not always apply to the subject 
matter («cultural heritage»), because concurring powers also 
include another subject («promotion and organization of cultural 
activities»), therefore also the Regions have lawmaking authority 
on the same subject – within the limits of the implementation 
rules. 
What distinguishes the two powers (the «protection» 
governed by the state, and the «promotion» concurrently 
governed by the state as to the fundamental principles and by the 
regions as to the implementation rules) is not the subject – which 
is still « cultural heritage» – but the scope defined by the State or 
regions. 
Consequently, the boundary between the relevant powers 
will be located at the rather uneasy distinction between the 
relevant scopes that the two authorities share for the same subject. 
Not only.  To the extent to which the subject matters impose 
a scope, they tend to cross the border that can be hypothesized for 
themselves and supersede the established order of the (other) 
powers as it has been identified according to the objective 
criterion. 
For instance, the Constitutional Court ruled that the subject 
matter «fishing» falls within the residual powers of the regions 
(Case No. 213 of 2006), while the state has exclusive powers over 
the «protection of the environment and ecosystem». 
Who will then be granted lawmaking power with respect to 
sustainability measures for the «fishing effort» applicable to a 
certain stretch of the sea and to some of the fish species living 
there? 
It is beyond our scope to provide an answer to this question 
here – the reader may refer to Case No. 81 of 2007 for more detail. 
What is most important is that we underline that the teleological 
subject matter naturally tends to «cut across» the objectively 
identified powers. 
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In other terms, in the case discussed above, both the state 
and the region can be said to have powers, virtually: the 
regulation of the «fishing effort» belongs to the subject matter 
«fishing», but it also inevitably concerns «ecosystem protection», 
because the regulation of this peculiar aspect of the subject matter 
«fishing» involves safeguarding the natural habitat of the fish 
species13 – in other words, it involves «ecosystem protection». 
We should also add that the classification of legislative 
matters is not completed by either the objective or teleological 
criterion as they are particularly wide-ranging: several sub-classes 
can be found in Art. 117, such as «regulatory subject matters» (e.g., 
civil and criminal regulation: letter l), «coordination subject 
matters» (as in Art. 117, par. 2, letter r) and, to some extent, also 
the «“relating-with” subject matters», which alone raise some 
difficulties as to the identification of a well-defined, objective, 
material substance.  
We should especially consider those subject matters 
identifying a coordinating function: isn’t this after all an intention 
to be pursued, a goal to be achieved? To what extent, even if only 
conceptually, will the power assigned affect a specific sector in 
which the assignee performs a coordinating function? The 
impression we get is that this classification embodies some kind of 
a mixed type lying between the identification by an objective 
criterion and the identification by a teleological criterion. 
The problem becomes more serious if we consider a 
«coordinating subject matter» of some substance: e.g. 
«coordinating the public finance and tax system» – which can also 
be found among concurrent powers.  
According to the discussed framework, we should be able 
to imagine a (state) power «coordinating the fundamental 
principles of the finance and tax system» and a (regional) power 
«coordinating the implementation rules of the finance and tax 
system». As one can easily guess, it is quite problematic even to 
think of the ways in which a regional law should be made to 
coordinate the implementation rules of the financial and tax 
systems.  
                                                           
13 For further details on this topic, see B. Caravita, Diritto dell’ambiente (2005), 22 
et seq. 
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The examples provided – in their paradoxical nature – 
contribute to introduce the theme of the role performed by 
«legislative matters», and their attribution, to qualify state and 
regional legislative powers, but also to unveil a first limitation 
inherent in Const. Art. 117.  
 
 
1.4. Following: a premise … 
The statements above lead to a first focal point, which is 
peculiar to the distribution of legislative powers based on the 
assignment of legislative matters.  
On an abstract level, the assignment of a legislative matter 
to the exclusive or concurrent powers (or, if unenumerated, to the 
residual powers) is meant to separate the legislative contexts: if 
the state is granted exclusive powers, these are no longer available 
to regions; if concurrent powers are granted, the application 
contexts and modes shall be distinguished between state and 
regional (along the fundamental principles/implementation rules 
axis); if the matters have not been enumerated or assigned, they 
fall within regional powers according to the residual policy. 
However, the separation of powers based on the 
assignment of matters only holds in abstract terms.  
In concrete terms, as we have anticipated and will see in 
detail, even a sheer analysis of the content of legislative subject 
matters will inevitably produce an unpredictable amount of 
overlapping between legislative powers: state and regional 
lawmakers will find themselves to be competing with each other 
in nearly all contexts in which powers have been conferred based 
on legislative subject matters. 
In other terms, the separation of powers turns out to be the 
exception, while overlapping powers remains the rule. 
Therefore, if the framework of legislative subject matters of 
Const. Art. 117, seems to be directing lawmakers towards the 
separation of powers, as a matter of fact, subject matters will only 
serve to establish a relationship between the contexts of (and 
modes of regulating) the legislative powers conferred to each 
lawmaker. 
We can also try and assign an abstract, predetermined 
content to each of the legislative subject matters, but the ensuing 
framework of legislative powers will be the result of the interplay 
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between several subject matters (enumerated or unenumerated; 
pertaining to exclusive, concurrent, residual powers), so that the 
subject matters are held together in a relationship of reciprocity, 
which keeps on being gradually modified while becoming more 
solid as it is defined through legislative action and case law.  
In short, what we have is therefore dissociation between the 
content of legislative matters as it can be conceptualized and the 
content of legislative powers as it is implemented: this appears to 
be the common trait of both the old and new Article 117. 
To use a metaphor, the abstract framework of the state and 
regional legislative powers as defined in Const. Art. 117, can be 
represented as two football teams ready to play their match. Each 
player corresponds to a legislative subject matter while the 
players’ arrangement on the field is predictive of the moves of 
those who are going to cross the halfway line and those who are 
going to remain on their part of the field. 
Conversely, the materialized framework of legislative 
powers (i.e. the space that each lawmaker will actually occupy) 
corresponds to the actual game dynamics: there will be a team 
attacking and dominating the match while the other is on the 
defensive – which perfectly matches what happens with the 
legislative powers between State and regions in a specific system. 
These dynamics produces something inevitable: there will 
never be a system which does not display a certain separation 
between «subject matters» (i.e. the constitutional assignment of a 
certain subject to the abstract legislative power) and «powers» (i.e. 
the normative space which is actually occupied by the lawmaker 
as referred to the relevant provision). 
In the legal experience, the concept of «legislative matter», 
however one attempts to anchor it to a solid, objective ground, 
ends up fading away, getting more confused or, as recently 
reported – but the conclusion was pretty clear even prior to the 
constitutional amendment – «dematerializing»14: accordingly, 
subject matters become «pure ideas» and, with their preceptive 
and defining content, can only preserve their worth as long as 
they remain in their «noumenon». In the legal phenomenology, 
                                                           
14 The topic was developed by F. Benelli, La “smaterializzazione” delle materie 
(2006) and by R. Bin, «Problemi legislativi e interpretativi nella definizione delle 
materie di competenza regionale». Rileggendo Livio Paladin dopo la riforma del Titolo 
V, in Scritti in memoria di Livio Paladin (2004). 
CALZOLAIO - STATE AND REGIONAL LEGISLATION IN ITALY 
410 
 
when they descend into the material world, they «dematerialize», 
i.e. they switch from being a «mental icon» to becoming a 
«relational property», which is based not (only) on the abstract 
content of something called «legislative matter», but (also) on the 
positions of strength that the (assumed) assignee of that matter 
holds and can enforce. 
If the assignee lacks the strength for enforcing – according 
to the constitutional provisions – the assigned legislative matter in 
his/her relationship with the weaker, per tabulas non-assignee, the 
matter will never turn into «power», but will remain suspended in 
a world that does not belong to us, albeit it is going to be 
regulated by the hypothetical non-assignee. 
Perhaps this is also the reason why the category 
«limitations of the legislation» defines the «legislative matter» 
better than the subject matter itself can do: the «limitation» more 
easily establishes the «relation» of power not only between subject 
matters, but more appropriately between assignees of those 
powers that can hypothetically be exercised. 
To this purpose, on a conceptual level, the dynamics is 
explained by referring to the thorough evaluation of the «interest 
raised» around each legislative power and, especially, around 
each case of overlapped legislative matters and powers. 
In other terms, a general parameter is available – which the 
Court has actually explicated since its very first decisions on 
regional subjects15 – that can help interpret the exercise of regional 
legislative powers, a parameter which we could define «the 
regional quality of interests»: the Constitution assigns regions a 
number of legislative matters, yet the actual powers devolved to 
the regional legislative authority are those corresponding to the 
regional dimension of the regulated interests.  
Both the statement and the interpretation are absolutely 
beyond dispute, though not necessarily exhaustive, as they do not 
account for the fact that a specific interest should be qualified as 
either state or regional at the outset. 
We’d better go back to our metaphor then: in the example 
provided, the football field on which both teams are going to play 
is symmetrical, i.e. each team have their own «half of the field» 
which mirrors the other half; in fact, they are interchangeable (the 
                                                           
15 See Constitutional Court, Case No. 7 of 1956. 
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teams generally exchange their positions between the first and the 
second half of the match). 
A question arises: Does the same apply to the state-regions 
relationship as to the relevant legislative powers? 
On this matter, we immediately discover that the «playing 
field» is anything but symmetrical and, above all, that the 
constitutional provisions that define its borders are not primarily 
those which assign legislative matters in Const. Art. 117.  
In other words, the provisions concerning legislative 
matters are the latest addendum of a certain organizational model, 
and financial planning, of the state (or “republic”, as it should 
currently be called) and of a certain model for the protection of 
basic rights and individual juridical situations in general, which 
represents the playing field where the competition between state 
and regional lawmakers takes place. 
As a matter of fact, regional lawmakers are denied the 
possibility to make laws in key sectors of the juridical system (civil 
and criminal law, civil procedural and criminal procedural law, 
administrative procedural law, fundamental rights law, to name 
the most obvious). 
As a consequence, regions find themselves in a subordinate 
condition as regards their capacity to make a difference in the 
arena of national policies, and struggle to assure the expected 
degree of financial independence from state decisions. 
In short, the lack of a Chamber of the Regions that might 
affect the approach of the state legislation at its very inception16, 
the lack of implementation – currently only provisional 
considering that Act No. 42 of 2009 delegated the implementation 
of the so-called «fiscal federalism» to the government – of the 
principles of financial independence contained in Const. Art. 119, 
the removal of entire sectors of the regional juridical system – but 
for few exceptions – through limitations of the regional legislation 
(which was practically achieved in the passage from the old to the 
new Article 117), all of this confines the exercise of regional 
legislative powers to a limited section of the juridical system (i.e, 
                                                           
16 Among the many contributions on this subject, read the persuasive comments 
by S. Staiano, Note introduttive, in M. Scudiero (ed.), I Le Autonomie al centro 
(2007), XVI et seq. Read more in general about the topic in L. Castelli, Il Senato 
delle autonomie (2010).  
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recalling the football metaphor, the match is only played in the 
penalty area on the «regional» side of the football field). 
In this perspective, the ability to regulate and distribute the 
actual powers related to legislative matters exemplifies a 
«precipitate», not a «precondition», of the overall system 
organization. 
This issue is crucial, in our opinion, both to explaining the 
current situation, and to understanding the role played by the 
legislative matters in relation to subjects of state and regional 
interest. 
In the latter perspective, the delimitation of the playing 
ground where the state and regional legislative matters are called 
to compete (i.e. a certain overall organizational model of the 
constitutional system) ex ante solves the bulk of power conflicts by 
qualifying the dimension of the state and regional interests. To 
which we can add that the implied qualification is anything but 
immutable, as it depends on the interpretation – lately, more 
cultural than juridical – of two decisive provisions in our 
Constitutional Chart: Article 3 (the principle of equality in a 
formal and substantial sense: to what extent can a body of 
legislation differ from region to region in the context of citizens’ 
equality before the law?) and Article 5 (the principle of unity and 
indivisibility of the Republic and the principle of devolution: how 
can these conflicting principles be brought to terms, and what 
kind of balance can be achieved between the two?).  
Once the limits of the basic organizational system are 
marked in a more or less regional direction – undoubtedly less so 
in the Italian system – the role of legislative matters is essentially 
recessive: they can only play their role in conferring powers in the 
given context. This limiting perspective for the regions will 
progressively restrict the interpretation of matters concerning 
regional legislative powers. 
For this reason, as we shall see, while the whole 
nomenclature of the limitations to which regional lawmakers are 
subjected has practically changed, the amendment to Title V of the 
Constitution has failed (sofar) to shift the legislative power 
exercise axis credibly and, more generally, to assure the proper 
degree of regional (political) independence. 
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1.5. Following: … and two conclusive viewpoints 
After providing a snapshot of the overall system of 
legislative powers and the role of legislative matters, we should 
throw some light onto the approach of the two agents of the 
institutional system who, in the praxis following the constitutional 
amendment, had to take a stand on its impact. 
We will therefore introduce the conclusive viewpoints of 
both the state lawmaker and the legislative power referee (in line 
with the football match metaphor), i.e. the Constitutional Court. 
As noted elsewhere, such a significant constitutional reform 
as the amendment of Title V “requires that Parliament should 
implement an active and coherent institutional policy, mindful of 
those procedures meant to assure the effective involvement of the 
Regions, the lack of which would result in a dangerously growing 
risk of dysfunctionalities and degeneration that could not be 
compensated by the action of any other constitutional body, in the 
long run”17. 
As a matter of fact, throughout the 14th legislature – and, for 
other reasons, even the 15th and the current one, the 16th – state 
lawmakers have approached the matter from a totally opposite 
viewpoint: far from taking the amendment to Title V seriously, 
they have continued to legislate as if nothing had changed. 
This became clearly evident as the state legislators 
continued, especially in budget laws, to create and regulate funds 
and functions falling within regional powers, or even to try and 
get ahead of the newly amended constitution, especially as 
regards the granting of regulatory powers (otherwise removed 
from the state concurrent powers: see Art. 117, par. 6), by 
formulating unprecedented «decrees of a non-regulatory nature». 
Another aspect related to the first is the extremely weak 
(and substantially failed) attempt at implementing a constitutional 
reform through Law No. 131 of 2003 (the so-called La Loggia law), 
which was dimidiated by the Constitutional Court18 itself. 
                                                           
17 See U. De Siervo, Il sistema delle fonti: il riparto della potestà normativa fra Stato e 
Regioni, in 6 Le Reg. 1264 (2004). 
18 See Cases Nos. 236, 238, 280 of 2004. In particular, in Case No. 280, the Court 
had to face a dual proxy for the adoption of legislative measures «only meant to 
acknowledge the fundamental principles that can be drawn from the laws in 
force»: the one concerning concurrent powers, the other concerning matters of 
shared powers (respectively, Art. 1, par. 4 and 5), which we will discuss in the 
CALZOLAIO - STATE AND REGIONAL LEGISLATION IN ITALY 
414 
 
A third, crucial aspect concerns the failed – at least on an 
operational level – attempt at carrying into effect the “fiscal 
federalism” by the relevant High Commission during the 14th 
legislature, which currently (and perhaps decisively) found a 
remedy in the implementation provisions in matters of «fiscal 
federalism» through proxy law No. 42 of 2009. 
These three concurrent causes have produced an 
institutional framework in which regions have been granted more 
legislative powers on paper, while actually nothing has really (and 
automatically) changed on the level of both the administrative 
functions and the financial resources and independence (which 
are still regulated by laws in force prior to the constitutional 
amendment). 
This, in turn, has produced – this is recent history – a very 
considerable amount of conflicts to be addressed by the 
Constitutional Court: after Title V of the Constitution was 
amended, the number of rulings by the Constitutional Court 
concerning the application of the new powers introduced in 2001 
has increased exponentially, especially as regards legislative 
powers. 
In short, it appears that the Constitutional Court has taken 
on the role of «referee of the legislative powers» and, more 
generally, of the State-Regions relationship. 
To fully understand the distribution of legislative powers in 
the Italian system, we need to refer to the Constitutional Court’s 
relentless work of modulating legislative powers. 
We’ll introduce this second viewpoint – the constitutional 
judge’s viewpoint – because, in our opinion, in the short time 
elapsed since the new constitution has come into force (hardly a 
decade), the Court has gradually developed and changed its own 
approach to the amendment of Title V19. More specifically, after an 
                                                                                                                                              
next pages. In short, the Court reduced the capacity of the former to purely 
formal acknowledgement of fundamental principles and declared the latter 
constitutionally illegitimate. 
19 In this regard it should be pointed out that the reform of Title V had been 
hailed by most of the doctrine – understandably – as an amendment which 
would have radically changed the relationship between State and regional 
legislation in such a way as to favor the latter. See, among others, B. Caravita, 
La Costituzione dopo la riforma del Titolo V (2004), 69 et seq.; M. Olivetti, Le 
funzioni legislative regionali, in T. Groppi, M. Olivetti (eds.), La Repubblica delle 
autonomie (2003), 91 et seq. Opponents, conversely, had expressed a more 
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initial set of decisions which established new scenarios as 
compared to the former distribution system, the Court took 
remedial measures, probably on account of the inertial action of 
the Government-Parliament dyad. 
In that sense, as the constitutional case law which followed 
the amendment to Title V is extremely varied and complex, we 
deem it useful to offer a quick history of constitutional case law at 
different time intervals, in spite of the limits that such an 
operation may have. Considering that the bulk of decisions we 
refer to is in the order of thousands, it goes without saying that 
what we’ll be able to provide is only a general trend in case law. 
In our opinion, the Court’s judicial review in the area of 
regional powers has undergone three stages in the past years. 
At a first stage, between 2002 and 2003, the Court maintained 
an attitude of open-mindedness on the innovations introduced 
with the constitutional amendment (while keeping silent as to the 
behavior that could be expected of the institutions): Cases Nos. 
282 and 407 of 2002, No. 94 of 2003, as we shall see in the next 
pages, exemplify an attempt to make the most of the regional 
legislation and its prospects. 
The approach that is attributed to the Constitutional Court 
appears to be even clearer when comparing these earlier decisions 
with the earliest decisions on regional matters that had been taken 
immediately after the establishment of the ordinary regions 
(reference is made to the decisions of 1971-72, which certainly 
point out, in several respects, the inherent supremacy of the State). 
In short, the Court did not initially intend to maintain a 
suspicious or cautious approach to the amendment of Title V: on 
the contrary, it openly acknowledged the effects that the reversed 
division-of-powers policy had in inverting the burden of proof – 
meant to provide evidence for the ownership of legislative powers 
                                                                                                                                              
problematic vision of the relationship between the new provisions of Art. 117, 
par. 2-4, and the reality ensuing from the relations between State and regional 
law. See especially the contributions by R. Bin, L'interesse nazionale dopo la 
riforma: continuità dei problemi, discontinuità della giurisprudenza costituzionale; P. 
Caretti, L'assetto dei rapporti tra competenza legislativa statale e regionale, alla luce 
del nuovo Titolo V della Costituzione: aspetti problematici; R. Tosi, La legge 
costituzionale n. 3 del 2001: note sparse in tema di potestà legislativa ed 
amministrativa; and G. Falcon, Modello e "transizione" nel nuovo Titolo V della Parte 
seconda della Costituzione, in 6 Le Reg. respectively 1213 et seq.; 1223 et seq.; 1233 
et seq.; 1247 et seq. (2001). 
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– which, after the amendment, was placed on the State (Case No. 
282/02). 
At the same time, state powers were partially «relieved» of 
the «protection of the environment and ecosystem» – which 
seemed to strip the regions of a conspicuous part of their 
legislative history (probably the most positive part considering the 
normative space it occupied) – thus limiting the legislative powers 
of the state to setting minimum standards of protection whenever 
concurrent conditions occurred (407/02), which in turn 
introduced an argumentation scheme in the relationship between 
legislative powers that was generally not unfavorable to the 
regions. 
The state lawmaker’s inactiveness – as we have mentioned 
before – and the lack of legislative implementation expected in the 
long run – both affecting the modulation of relevant powers and 
the inherently interrelated “financial relationships” – urge that the 
Court, besides deciding on critical (and hence political) matters 
such as budget laws, found instruments to enable the independent 
and «comprehensive» implementation of the constitutional 
amendment, since the end of 2003, and throughout 2004. 
The historical development of this fairly large body of 
Court decisions seems to suggest that a genuine choice – made 
necessary by events, yet meant to preserve the postulated 
unification (although in some cases with certain precautions) – 
was implicitly exercised by the Constitutional Court.  
The Court decisions made at that time included: 
a) Case No. 274 of 2003, by which (on the ground of 
Case No. 94 of 2003) the Constitutional Court confirmed the 
asymmetry of the questions raised by State and regions in the 
contestation of the relevant legislative acts before the Court (based 
on the evidence of Const. Art. 5 itself); 
b) Cases No. 303 of 2003 and No. 6 of 2004 (the so-
called «legislative subsidiarity», which will be discussed further 
on in this paper); 
c) Cases No. 370 of 2003 and No. 13 of 2004 (the so-
called principle of «institutional continuity», which will be 
discussed further on in this paper); 
d) once more, Case No. 370 of 2003 in which the Court 
ruled that the residual policy was not to be applied automatically; 
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e) Case No. 14 of 2004 (in which «competition 
protection» was interpreted as a dynamic, cross-cutting subject 
matter that allowed the state to be in charge of economic policy 
management tools); 
f) Cases Nos. 307 and 331 of 2003, concerning 
«electrosmog» (which at least partially improved the provisions of 
Case No. 407 of 2002 imposing further restrictions on the regional 
lawmaker’s right to in-melius derogation from the state rules for 
the environmental protection); 
g) numerous decisions which acknowledged the lack of 
implementation of Art. 119 and explained the principles and the 
resulting limitations that were imposed on the state lawmaker 
(since the very Case No. 370 of 2003); 
h) Case No. 308 of 2003 which, following No. 88 of 
2003, seemed to initiate the «season of loyal cooperation», 
asserting that “in those cases in which the exercises of powers cannot be 
clearly defined due to their functional relationship, the principle of «loyal 
cooperation» will apply”. 
Compared to the former period, a quantum leap in quality 
seems to have been taken since 2005. 
The Court finally realized it had been left «alone» and, after 
«La Loggia» law (Case No. 280/04) substantially failed to 
implement the constitutional amendment, it decided to proceed, 
in the most absolute inactivity of the system, by referring to its 
own juridical precedents. 
Therefore, in a number of subject matters that we are now 
going to analyze, the deviation from the original model is even 
more striking: what is achieved is no longer an evolutionary (or 
creative) interpretation of the Constitutional Chart, but a real 
«interpretation of the interpretation». 
In other words, in the latest years, in many areas and in 
reference to various legislative matters, the parameter of the Court 
has no longer been a certain interpretation of the constitutional 
provisions (legislative matters and principles) in the amended text 
of Title V – though still somehow at work until 2005 – but it has 
rested, as the principal issue, on the interpretation of those 
parameters already given by constitutional judicial review, to 
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which further developments in the interpretation are added, 
predominantly based on this body of case law20. 
Leveraging the described dynamic case law, the Court – as 
it will be specified below – has in the past three years changed 
some basic interpretation guidelines as to the configuration of 
legislative matters of particular importance in the understanding 
of the relationships between state and regional powers. 
This observation is useful to understand the special bond 
that characterizes the relationship between Government and 
Parliament, on the one hand, and the Constitutional Court, on the 
other hand, in the overall configuration of the relationship 
between state and regional legislation. 
In fact, it is no coincidence that the expansion of certain 
state powers in the constitutional judicial review coincided with 
the approval of key state "reform" normative acts in those areas 
(we refer, e.g., to the Public Contracts Code and the 
Environmental Protection Code – respectively, Legislative Decree 
No. 163 and n. 152 of 2006 – and even before, the Electronic 
Communications Code, Legislative Decree No. 259 of 2003). 
The complex amending moves necessary to match the 
model introduced by the constitutional amendment of Title V with 
the institutional and legislative practice tend to emphasize the 
symbiotic relationship – in regional matters – between state 
policies and the Constitutional Court’s interpretation of the 
system of regulatory powers. 
In this framework, we are now going to analyze the overall 
orientation – a detailed analysis on each subject would be 
impossible due to space constraints – provided by the 
Constitutional Court as to the system of exclusive, concurrent, and 
residual legislative powers. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
20 At this «third stage», the Constitutional Court’s decisions would typically 
reserve a paragraph of the motivations to the organic reconstruction of the 
juridical precedents about the matter discussed in the interpretation and, based 
on that, the Court would release its decision.  
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2. Exclusive powers 
2.1. Introduction. The framework of powers reserved to 
the state. 
We have earlier mentioned the essential features of the 
subject matters listed in Article 117, as identified according to 
objective or teleological criteria. 
We need now to point out that, as was noted elsewhere, the 
actual powers reserved to the state do not even formally find 
completion in the exclusive powers listed in Art. 117, par. 221. 
Above all, it should be noted that "teleological matters", 
when assigned to the exclusive power of the state, tend to be 
considered as cross-cutting matters. 
The development of Constitutional Court case law in 
response to cross-cutting issues calls for a double-track approach 
that chronologically illustrates the advances in both 
environmental protection and competition protection, albeit 
separately. 
The subject matters that have not (as yet) taken on a cross-
cutting connotation will follow. 
 
 
2.2. Cross-cutting matters 
The Constitutional Court has given full consideration to the 
«cross-cutting matter» concept in the case law which followed the 
amendment of Title V, and identified – among the subject matters 
listed in Art. 117, par. 2 – some issues for possible intervention by 
the state, which would at first sight, on the paper (i.e. according to 
Art. 117), appear to be reserved for the regional lawmaker22. 
We should start by saying that the mere identification of a 
cross-cutting issue does not necessarily imply that this will expand 
state powers both quantitatively and qualitatively. 
                                                           
21 It was appropriately reminded that “further areas of exclusive state 
legislation than those listed in Art. 117 par. 2 can be inferred from a number of 
constitutional provisions (Art. 33, par. 6; Art. 114, par. 3; Art. 116, par. 3; Art. 
117, par. 5 and 9; Art. 118, par. 2 and 3; Art. 119, par. 3, 5 and 6; Art. 120, par. 2; 
Art. 125; Art. 132, par. 2; Art. 133, par. 1)”: G. Scaccia, Legislazione esclusiva statale 
e potestà legislativa residuale delle Regioni, in F. Modugno, P. Carnevale (ed.), 
Trasformazioni della funzione legislativa, vol. IV – Ancora in tema di rapporti Stato-
Regioni dopo la riforma del titolo V della Parte II della Costituzione (2007), 113 et seq. 
22 V. G. Falcon, Modello e transizione nel nuovo Titolo V della Parte seconda della 
Costituzione, in 6 Le Reg. 1252 et seq. (2001).  
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As we shall see below – e.g. in the case with the “protection 
of the environment and ecosystem” – the «cross-cuttingness» has 
sometimes come into play at a time when state powers were being 
withdrawn and specific legislative powers were being vested in 
the regions.  
The (basic) matters that have been explicitly identified as 
cross-cutting among those falling within the State’s exclusive 
powers include the “protection of the environment and ecosystem” 
(leading case, Case No. 407 of 2002); the “essential service levels 
relating to civil and social rights to be guaranteed regardless of the 
geographical borders of local authorities” (in this case,  the cross-
cutting issue was acknowledged by an obiter dictum contained in 
Case No. 282 of 2002, and referred to, inter alia, in Cases Nos. 88 
and 370 of 2003); “competition protection” (leading case, Case No. 14 
of 2004, later confirmed, inter alias, by Case No. 272 of 2004); 
“criminal justice system” (leading case, Case No. 185 of 2004). 
Contrary to what might be expected, the Italian 
constitutional jurisprudence has not developed a unitary concept 
of «cross-cutting matter». The «cross-cutting» content of these 
subject matters is treated differently and even takes on 
independent meaning and scope for each of them. 
In an effort to summarize, the Court actually affirmed that 
“environmental protection is not to be seen strictly as a subject matter, 
but rather as a constitutional value which, as such, represents a cross-
cutting matter; this gives rise to distinct powers, which may well be 
vested in the regions, while the decisions about questions demanding 
uniform treatment over the national territory should remain the concern 
of the State” (407/02). 
This substantiates the idea that vesting the State with 
legislative powers over environmental protection will not prevent 
regional laws from intervening to improve it, provided that the 
regions are legitimately entitled to do so by provisions in Art. 117, 
paragraph 3 or 4, and that these interventions fall within the 
minimum standards of protection set by state law. 
In other words, the state powers over cross-cutting issues 
arise, as specified before, from the need to make more room for 
regional lawmaking; yet, as the value attached to environmental 
protection would suggest, not only have the borders become 
blurred, but, more importantly, the contents have become confused 
and confusing (to the regional lawmakers’ advantage). 
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As far as essential service levels (hereinafter «ESL») are 
concerned, the constitutional judge specified that “they cannot be 
strictly considered as a subject matter, but rather as an underlying 
component encompassing all subject matters, for which the state 
lawmaker shall be allowed to set the necessary rules in order to ensure 
full enjoyment of the relevant rights throughout the national territory, 
thus preventing any limitations or constraints that might be imposed by 
the regional lawmaker” (282/02). 
What the Court did was not only to identify a cross-cutting 
matter that touched a variety of matters, as in the case with 
environmental protection, but more generally it contributed to 
describe an as yet indefinite and a priori indefinable, but  
potentially all-encompassing “non-matter”. 
Accordingly, “competition protection”, the Court added, 
“does not show the characteristics of a definite subject matter, but those 
of a power that can be exercised on many different subjects, (...) hence the 
inclusion of this state power in Const. Art. 117, par. 2, letter e), which 
evidences the 2001 state lawmaker’s intention to bring those economic 
policy tools which (…) are the expression of a unifying power solidly into 
the State’s responsibility. The state’s intervention is therefore justified by 
its relevance to macroeconomics"(14/04). On this basis, it was added 
that “the intervention of the state lawmaker is legitimate if contained 
within the limits of appropriateness and proportionality” (345/05). 
In this case, therefore, cross-cuttingness results from the 
macroeconomic importance attached to the state intervention, and 
it is through this criterion that the extent of state power and, 
conversely, of regional power can be identified. In reality – but we 
will return on this later – in the most recent case law the Court 
seems to have expanded the "regulatory" capacity of the matter, 
thus extending its scope and partly changing its identification 
criteria. 
Lastly, the state powers in matters of “criminal justice 
system” imply that “the regions do not have any powers that entitle 
them to make laws in order to introduce, repeal or modify the penalties 
prescribed by state laws on the same matter” (185/04). 
The Constitutional Court (implicitly recalling its previous 
case law) also added that “the «criminal matter», understood as the 
set of assets and values to which the greatest protection is afforded, 
cannot normally be determined in advance; it comes at a time when the 
state lawmaker sets incriminatory provisions, and this can actually occur 
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in any sector, irrespective of the division of legislative powers between 
the state and the regions. It is by definition an instrumental power that 
the State exercises and that can potentially affect the most diverse sectors, 
even those included in the exclusive, concurrent or residual legislative 
powers of the regions”. 
In the case at issue, under the guise of a cross-sectoral 
matter, a general limit that the Constitutional Court had identified 
since its inception is confirmed, namely the so-called «limit of 
criminal justice matters»23, according to which the power to 
regulate legal issues in criminal cases is inherently vested in the 
State. Moreover, by the statement above the Court categorically 
reaffirms that no allotment of subject matters may affect or limit 
that power of the State. 
We find it relevant to make a final remark, which has partly 
emerged before: for each cross-sectoral matter that the Court 
expressly acknowledged, the constitutional justice makes sure that 
a parameter is identified, a sort of stop-limit, which can help 
restrict (or at least control by means of interpretation) the 
expansive exercise to the damage of regional powers. 
With regard to environmental protection, this function is 
initially accomplished – except as discussed in the next paragraph 
– by the principle of in-melius derogation (182/06) and the 
corresponding reference to the definition of state powers in terms 
of setting the «minimum standards of protection» (407/02). 
With regard to «ESL», the function is accomplished by the 
principle of loyal cooperation, by a certain intepretation of the 
provisions ruling such a power and by the clear statement of the 
Constitutional Court according to which this power cannot be 
used “to identify the constitutional basis of the state regulation of whole 
subject matters” (respectively, 88/03, 370/03, 285/05)24. 
                                                           
23 See C. Ruga Riva, Regioni e diritto penale. Interferenze, casistica, prospettive 
(2008). 
24 Of particular relevance is the Court’s latest decision, no. 10 of 2010, that found 
legitimacy in the state provisions concerning the renowned «social card» issued 
by the state to cope with the most severe poverty situations at a time when the 
financial and economic crisis was growing more serious: referring to the current 
situation of crisis and basing its decisions on the state powers in matters of 
«ESL», the Court affirmed that “in other words, such an intervention by the state 
shall have to be considered admissible, should it be necessary to actually ensure the 
protection of those people who, being in dire straits, claim a fundamental right which, as 
it is strictly inherent to the protection of the inalienable core of human dignity, 
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With regard to competition protection, the function is 
accomplished (at least initially) by the macroeconomic nature of 
the intervention as assessed in accordance with principles of 
adequacy and proportionality (14/04, 345/05). 
After all, even in the case with the criminal justice system, 
the claim that the exercise of state powers in criminal justice 
matters should “always be contained within the limits of non-manifest 
unreasonableness (...) in accordance with the last resort criterion” 
means that “the limitation of regional legislative powers is justified 
when state law tends to preserve the heritage, values and interests of its 
entire community, on equal terms” (185/04). 
It is therefore noted that the dynamics of the three major 
cross-cutting matters (environmental protection, competition 
protection, ESL) – at this first stage of judicial review – tends to 
establish a relationship (peculiar to each of them) between state 
and regional powers, in which there is still theoretically the 
possibility for the regional lawmaker to intervene in areas 
teleologically related to such (cross-cutting) matters falling within 
exclusive state powers. 
 
 
2.3. The new approach to the cross-cutting matters 
«environmental protection» and «competition protection» 
(2007/10) 
Starting from a core of decisions in 2007, which were later 
confirmed, the Constitutional Court changed its approach with 
regard to the interpretation of the matters «environmental 
protection» and «competition protection». 
As far as «environmental protection» is concerned, the 
Constitutional Court clearly stated, in contradiction to what was 
expressed in the mentioned Case No. 407/02, that environmental 
protection makes a matter of its own which regards a nationally 
recognized legal concern (the environment), whose discipline is 
vested exclusively in the state (see Cases No. 387 of 2007, No. 225 
of 2009, and No. 104 of 2008 – among others – from which the 
following quotations are drawn). 
                                                                                                                                              
especially when the peculiar situations mentioned above realize, shall have to be ensured 
all over the national territory in a homogeneous, appropriate and timely manner, by 
means of a coherent regulation, appropriate to the scope”. 
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It remains true that “next to the environment as a nationally 
recognized asset, other “legal” assets can coexist which relate to 
components or aspects of the environment as an asset, concerning 
different interests that are legally protected”, and that therefore we 
can talk about “the environment as a «cross-cutting matter», in the 
sense that different interests converge on the same subject: those related 
to the preservation of the environment and those related to its uses”. 
In such cases, however, “the national legislation on the 
protection of the environment as a general asset, which is vested 
exclusively in the State, prevails over that vested in the regions or the 
autonomous provinces, with regard to their powers which concern the 
use of the environment and, therefore, other interests”. 
We can conclude that “the state legislation on environmental 
protection «actually operates as a limit to the legislation that the regions 
and autonomous provinces have laid down on other matters within their 
powers», except when they adopt higher environmental protection rules 
in the exercise of powers provided by the Constitution which come into 
contact with those ruling environmental protection. This is therefore the 
sense in which the environment can be understood as a «cross-cutting 
matter» (as repeatedly stated in the case law of this Court; see Case No. 
246 of 2006 for all), and it cannot be said, as the regions Veneto and 
Lombardy would like to say, that «the environmental matter cannot be 
understood as such in a technical sense».  On the contrary, the 
environment is a legal asset that, pursuant to Const. Art. 117, par. 2, 
letter s), also serves as a dividing line between matters within exclusive 
state powers and matters within regional powers”25. 
As regards “competition protection”, the result is the same 
but with different arguments. 
In short, the Court refers to competition as a means of 
protecting and promoting competitive assets of the market and in 
the market, in keeping with the EU notion itself. In this sense, and 
when the available state provision pursues this goal, it can be 
implemented in every material sector, appearing as a «cross-
cutting matter». The need remains to test the appropriateness and 
                                                           
25 With reference to the environmental matter, therefore, the planning of a 
policy and coordination function can be admitted [partial preemption] and, 
above all, unlike what seemed to be implied, the administrative functions, as 
outlined in the Legislative Decree No. 112 of 1998, can be revised in the 
direction of a centralized exercise of the state legislative power over 
environmental matters [total preemption] (see Case No. 232/09). 
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proportionality of the state legislative actions (as argued in Cases 
Nos. 401, 430, 431, 452/07). 
The departure from earlier case law in both matters here 
deserves particular emphasis not so much because of the 
emerging argumentative outlines, but rather because of the 
consequences that they immediately produce.  
As it will be clear later when discussing the use of the 
principle of loyal cooperation in managing the system of 
legislative powers, the Constitutional Court's approach clearly sets 
a limit to the regions’ claim that they should be involved in the 
exercise of legislative powers and the ensuing regulatory powers 
in these matters.  
The Court specifies that since both matters concern the 
exercise of exclusive – albeit cross-sectoral – powers of the State, 
this will not be bound to consult the regions about the legislative 
and regulatory acts to be adopted. 
In this sense, both matters, at this point, establish a real, 
new limitation for the regional lawmaker – at least with respect to 
its extent – and actually it is a particularly pervasive limitation, as 
it impacts a large portion of regional powers. 
In fact – and we refer to practical case law, not to an 
abstract interpretation of subject matters –environmental 
protection is typically related to a range of concurrent and 
residual regional powers, such as health protection, territorial 
government, fish and game26. 
Competition protection has no less impact since it usually 
relates with regional powers in matters of trade, industry and 
economic activities in general, and with (local) public services, to 
name just the best known. 
In these cases, therefore, to quickly go back to the 
theoretical perspective, it is now clear that there is no clear-cut 
separation between state and regional legislation in all these areas, 
and it will be necessary to verify the order and nature of the state 
and regional regulation to qualify the subject matter that should 
encompass the regulatory intervention, so as to legitimize (or de-
legitimize) the exercise of the relevant power. 
                                                           
26 Refer to http:/www.dirittoregionale.it for examples of overlapping matters, 
which are numerous in this sector.  
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However, the relational model to which this new approach 
for the mentioned cross-sectoral powers refers is peculiar. 
Whenever legislative power is exercised in either cross-
cutting matter, the state law acts as a limit to the regional 
legislation, although this implies invading the regional power 
(which, after all, is in line with the old national interest model). 
This means that the space occupied by the State in these matters, 
even if it affects regional powers, is automatically removed from 
the regions, which cannot claim involvement even only in terms of 
loyal cooperation with the legislative power of the State, and will 
also lose their regulatory powers (which comply with the formal 
model as in Art. 117, par. 6: they are vested in the State in matters 
of exclusive powers). 
This aspect is particularly important not only because it 
changes (or reinforces) the invasive outline of these powers of the 
State. As a matter of fact, the new element introduced by these 
decisions is the re-introduction of an apparently outdated 
relational model between state and regional powers. 
However, in those cases when state and regional legislative 
powers overlap, a situation which is effectively depicted with the 
term «concurrence of powers», the Constitutional Court adopted – 
and keeps on adopting beyond the context of these matters – a 
number of decisive criteria which ensured the legitimacy of state 
legislation while somehow compensating the regional level by 
providing regional involvement in the implementation of the state 
legislation (usually through a statement or agreement on 
measures for implementing the national legislation during the 
State-Regions Conference). 
With reference to the above mentioned cross-cutting 
matters, however, the relational model is quite the opposite, 
although the case in point is similar: as it is simple to understand, 
by definition, if a state power is «cross-sectoral», in operational 
terms, it implies overlapping powers. 
On the contrary: the overlap is realized precisely in the 
«cross-cutting» part of the matter at issue and usually gives rise to 
the intertwining of powers (both state cross-sectoral powers and 
regional powers). 
In this case, the plot is easily solved: the power is vested in 
the State, there is no need for any form of trustful cooperation. The 
state legislation introduces and acts as a limit on the regional 
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legislation. The regional lawmaker is stripped of the relevant 
legislative power. 
In that regard, the Court has recently pointed out – as if it 
wanted to establish a parallelism between limits on the 
environmental protection matter and limits on the competition 
protection matter, and also to define its scope – that “the pursuit of 
environmental protection by the regional lawmaker can only be accepted 
if it is a marginal and indirect effect of the guidelines adopted by the 
region in the exercise of its legitimate powers, provided that it does not 
clash with the goals set by state regulations for the protection of the 
environment (Case No. 431 of 2007)”. 
Case No. 431 of 2007 expressed the same concept with 
regard to competition protection.  
One last remark. If we look at the motivational content of 
the decisions described above, we cannot but notice some (newly 
introduced) convergence between the interpretive approach of the 
environmental and competition protection cross-cutting matters 
on the one hand, and criminal justice system, on the other. In 
either case, whenever state legislation is materialized in these 
areas, the limit on the regional lawmaker is confirmed (and 
extended): it operates in a way not unlike the limit of national 
interests before the amendment to Title V27. 
 
 
2.4. Potentially cross-cutting matters 
A final mention should be made to two specific matters that 
could be defined as potentially cross-cutting: «civil regulation»28 
and «heritage protection». 
The former, although not classified as a cross-cutting 
matter, ends up enacting, as the Court put it,  the old limit of 
private law, which, due to its wide scope and difficult 
predetermination, provides a  
“touch of cross-cuttingness” to the matter. 
In this sense, the Court stated that “the state’s legislative 
power includes aspects that are inherent in relationships of a private 
nature, for which there is a need for national uniformity; [that] it is not 
                                                           
27 See A. Barbera, Regioni e interesse nazionale (1974); and A. Barbera, Gli interessi 
nazionali nel nuovo Titolo V, in E. Rozo Acuňa (ed.), Lo Stato e le Autonomie (2003), 
12 et seq. 
28 See E. Lamarque, Regioni e ordinamento civile (2005). 
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excluded by the presence of aspects of specialty codes regarding code 
provisions; [that] it includes the rules governing legal persons under 
private law; [that] it includes institutions which are characterized by 
elements of public law, yet having a private law nature” (326/08). 
The latter, «heritage protection», – usually interpreted 
together with another matter under concurrent powers: 
«development of cultural and environmental heritage» – was 
considered by the Court to have a cross-cutting nature, in the 
same sense and for the same reasons as «environmental 
protection», i.e. to ensure a strong link between state and regional 
legislation, given the overlap of powers, which only the reference 
to Legislative Decree No. 112 of 1998 and, more recently, to 
Legislative Decree No. 42 of 2004, can partly remedy (9/04 and 
232/05). 
Also «heritage protection» followed (actually, partly 
anticipated) the same pattern as previously seen in the case of 
environmental protection (see Case No. 367/07). 
 
 
2.5. Matters with potentially defined content 
What follows documents a phenomenon opposite to that of 
the so-called «cross-cutting matters». That is, while the Court 
interpreted some state-governed matters or areas or sectors in 
their extensive and cross-cutting nature, in other cases (not 
seldom, though), it identified the limits and boundaries of state 
legislative matters. In the case of matters such as «public order 
and security» (letter h), «statistical coordination of state, regional 
and local government data» (letter r), and «legal and 
administrative organization of the state and national public 
agencies» (letter g), the Court has so far favored a plain reading, 
which collocates, defines and confines these powers. Furthermore, 
this line of interpretation is not always resolved in favor of the 
regional legislative powers, but it is certainly consistent with the 
overall approach of Art. 117 and shows that, in some cases, the 
enumerated matters can be filled with contents without having to 
resort to interpretations that contradict the system of the 
legislative powers allocated to each matter. 
Case No. 17 of 2004 represents a hypothesis of a strict 
reading of a matter assigned to exclusive state powers, such as the 
«statistical coordination of state, regional and local government 
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data». Of relevance here is the fact that a strict interpretation of the 
matter is aimed at limiting – in a manner favorable to the regions – 
the extent of the state regulation which, according to the Court, 
should be understood “as granting the Minister for Innovation and 
Technology a power (over the regions) which is limited to a merely 
technical coordination task”. 
The “coordination” idea, which could have been easily 
interpreted by the Court as expansive, was on the contrary 
deprived of its intrusiveness into regional powers and reduced to 
a “merely technical coordination”. Therefore, while on the one hand 
the contested provision is not declared unconstitutional, on the 
other hand the Court’s interpretation limits its scope to a degree of 
compatibility and compliance with the regional powers granted 
by the Constitution. 
A similar attitude is reflected in the interpretation of the 
matter «legal and administrative organization of the state and 
national public agencies»: in this hypothesis, a thicker and 
sometimes wavering case law has explicitly ruled out that it is or 
can be interpreted as a cross-sectoral power; the Court has also 
ruled out several times that the generic reference made by state 
law to «public administrations», in relation to the effects of certain 
regulatory bodies, could be interpreted as also including non-state 
agencies (see Cases Nos. 31/05, 270/05, 319/09). 
Last but not least, the matter «public order and security, 
with the exception of local administrative police» represents the 
first case of a restrictive interpretation of an exclusive state power 
after the constitutional amendment of 2001. Since Case No. 407 of 
2002 the Court has stated that, in order to justify a restrictive 
interpretation, it suffices to “note that the specific context of Art. 117, 
par. 2, letter h) – which almost entirely reproduces Art. 1, par. 3, letter l 
in Act No. 59 of 1997 – induces a restrictive interpretation of the concept 
of «public security», because of the textual connection with «public 
order» and the explicit exclusion of «local administrative police», as well 
as based on the preparatory work. «Public security», in fact, as this 
Court would traditionally put it, should be conceived, in opposition to 
the tasks of regional and local administrative police, as an area reserved 
to the State on measures related to crime prevention or maintenance of 
public order (Case No. 290 of 2001)”. 
Incidentally, two distinct meanings are attached to the 
notion of «public order» by the Supreme Court of Appeal and the 
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Constitutional Court, as the notion suggested by the 
Constitutional Court is more restrictive. 
In order to complete our analysis, it should be noted that in 
these matters the relational model (as referred to regional powers) 
is different from that of cross-cutting matters (environmental 
protection and competition protection): whenever state powers 
and regional powers intersect or overlap,  the Constitutional Court 
tends to solve the situation by referring to the concept of 
«concurrent powers» only – on which we will return – therefore 
through the prevalence criterion and, if necessary, the principle of 
loyal cooperation. 
 
 
2.6. State exclusive unenumerated powers: the case of 
«road traffic» 
A special case is to be reported, in which the Court, without 
resorting to special tools to take on state powers, directly relates 
an unenumerated subject matter to its exclusive power: this is the 
case of «road traffic». 
In Case No. 428 of 2004, the Court stated that “road traffic, 
even though not expressly mentioned in Const. Art. 117, cannot be 
placed in the residual area of powers reserved to the ordinary regions in 
Art. 117, par. 4. In relation to various aspects under which it can be 
considered, systematic considerations suggest that «road traffic» can be 
traced back in many ways to exclusive state powers, in accordance with 
Art. 117, par. 2”. 
The Court here refers to exclusive state powers in matters 
of «public order and security», «criminal justice system» and «civil 
regulation», «administrative justice» and «jurisdiction», to assert 
that «road traffic» is an exclusive power of the State, for systematic 
reasons, although «unenumerated» (on the same line of reasoning, 
more recently, is Case No. 9/09). 
Therefore, the systematic interpretation of certain sections 
under state jurisdiction can bring a matter («road traffic» in this 
case) within the exclusive power of the State, and this too is 
another relational model. The complex of state powers can lead to 
the inclusion of a matter within the exclusive powers of the State 
(supplementing the list in Art. 117, par. 2). 
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3. Concurrent powers 
3.1. The framework of concurrent powers. Introduction to 
the relationship between principle rule and 
implementation rule. The role of the implementation of 
Community law 
The amendment to Title V of the Constitution did not make 
it easier to identify the content of the fundamental principles set 
by the State in matters of concurrent powers, which proves to be 
perfectly in line with the original regional structure. In Case No. 
50 of 2005, the Court stated that “the concept of «fundamental 
principle» (...) is not and cannot be of a strict, universal nature, because 
“subject matters” have different levels of definition that can change over 
time. It is the lawmaker’s task to make choices as deemed appropriate and 
adjust each subject matter on the basis of essential normative criteria that 
the interpreter shall assess impartially without being influenced 
conclusively by any self-classification”. 
In reality, once more in line with the original regional 
structure, the Constitutional Court has often allowed 
implementation rules to be ranked as fundamental principles. In a 
recent decision that has been repeatedly quoted, the Court has 
taken up the claims made in the mentioned Case No. 50 of 2005 
and specified the role that the implementation of Community law 
may have in defining the relationship between principle rules and 
implementation rules: “in the implementation of Community law the 
definition of the internal allocation of powers between State and regions 
in matters of concurrent legislation and, therefore, the very identification 
of fundamental principles cannot disregard the analysis of the specific 
content as well as the purpose and needs to be pursued at Community 
level. In other words, the goals set by EU directives, although they do not 
affect how the separation of powers is achieved, may in fact require a 
specific articulation of the relationship between principle rules and 
implementation rules” (336/05). 
To put it shortly, the implementation of Community law 
may drag the fundamental principle into establishing 
implementation rules, as is the case at issue. 
More generally, the requirements for the implementation of 
EU directives – in continuity with Case. No. 126/96 – may entail 
centralizing implementation powers in the State, notwithstanding 
the internal framework for the division of legislative power 
(398/06). 
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With a view to implementing Community law, the 
Constitutional Court – in compliance with the law29 – considers 
legitimate for the State to adopt pliable implementation rules, 
even in matters of concurrent and, apparently, residual powers 
(see Case No. 399/06). 
The doubt remains that, beyond the requirements for the 
implementation of Community law, the state lawmaker may 
generally adopt implementation rules, even if pliable, on matters 
of concurrent powers (see, however, Cases Nos. 303/03, 401/07). 
 
 
3.2. Potentially cross-cutting matters. The special case of 
«linguistic minorities» 
Even concurrent powers include potentially expansive or 
cross-cutting matters. Among these is undoubtedly «territorial 
government», a matter which is one of the typical powers of the 
Region, which has gradually carved out a role for itself between 
the State and local authorities at a time when «territorial 
planning» activities were being regulated. 
This accounts for the decisions which regulate the specific 
powers in matters of «territorial government», in particular, «city 
planning» (303/03), «public housing» (362/03), «public works of 
the Regions and Local Government» (49/04), and most of the 
«building amnesty» (196/04) and «land reclamation boards» 
(282/04). 
It is a power that is recurrently invoked in judicial review, 
as it connects with many matters delegated to the State 
(environmental protection, cultural heritage preservation). For the 
sake of example, it is exactly the reference to the territorial 
government – along with other concurrent powers – that led the 
Court to suggest that the regions have powers over environmental 
matters; and it is the same matter that led the Court to «split» 
cases between criminal and administrative infractions in the so-
called «building amnesty case». These examples account for its 
potential cross-cuttingness. 
                                                           
29 Law No. 11 of 2005 (dealing with “Norme generali sulla partecipazione dell'Italia 
al processo normativo dell'Unione europea e sulle procedure di esecuzione degli obblighi 
comunitari”); referred to in L. Califano, Stato, Regioni e diritto comunitario nella 
legge n. 11/2005, in 4 Quad. cost. 862 (2005). 
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The same applies to the subject matters «health protection», 
«education» (for the settlement of the matter: 200/09), «job 
protection and security». 
For example, the responsibility for «nurseries» was equally 
shared between «education» and «job protection». (370/03, 
120/05), and the very fact that «school organization» was assigned 
to the regional power in matters of «education» originated the 
need, well perceived by the Court, to develop the principle of the 
so-called «institutional continuity» (13/04). 
Still, the Court broadly ruled out the adoptability by the 
State of acts of guidance and coordination in relation to matters of 
concurrent powers, namely in a ruling on «health protection» 
(329/03). 
The Court has identified two types of matters among 
concurrent powers: «scientific research», whose contents are 
acknowledgedly imbued in «constitutional value», and the 
«harmonization of public accounts and coordination of public 
finance», which embodies a purposive, goal-oriented function 
which ultimately rests with the State. 
In the former case, the Court stated that “scientific research 
shall be considered not only a “matter”, but also a constitutionally 
protected “value” (Const. Art. 9 and 33), and as such capable of getting 
over a framework of strictly defined powers” (423/04, 31/05, 365/06, 
178/07): in this sense, it legitimizes the potential recourse to the 
assumption of powers and functions by the State in subsidiarity in 
accordance with the procedure laid down in Cases No. 303 of 2003 
and No. 6 of 2004.  
Similarly, with regard to the «harmonization of public 
accounts and coordination of public finance», the Court believed 
that “the «teleological» essence of coordination requires that the central 
level can not only determine the basic rules governing the matter, but 
also exercise the specific powers that may be necessary to concretely 
realize the coordination function – which in itself inevitably exceeds, in 
part, any possible involvement of sub-state and local levels. (...) Of 
course, these powers must be configured in a manner appropriate to the 
existing spheres of autonomy guaranteed by the Constitution, with 
respect to which coordination can never exceed the limits beyond which it 
would be transformed into management activities or undue influence on 
the autonomous bodies” (376/03). 
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In another decision, the Court stated that “the coordination of 
public finance, referred to in Const. Art. 117, par. 3, is less a subject 
matter than a function vested in the State, since it extends to the national 
level, and to public finances as a whole” (414/04), coming almost 
naturally to argue that state legislation could also include 
particular precepts and «implementation» rules (35/05). 
The Court has at the same time developed a body of case 
law that seeks to limit the invasiveness of state legislation – in 
particular, with respect to the financial autonomy of local 
authorities – and identified the specific requirements requested of 
standards of financial coordination to qualify as «principle» rules 
(169/07): in short, they can demand that the overall spending of 
local authorities be limited, but they may not «audit» individual 
sectors in which those authorities need to reduce their costs (very 
clear in this regard is Case No. 27/2010, on the financing of 
mountain community services boards, which resulted in a 
situation of “double legislation” passed in both cases under 
review by the Constitutional Court). 
However, even in this area, the «subsidiarity principle» can 
always be accepted (376/03). 
A final remark must be made on the recent identification of 
powers vested in the State and the Regions in matters of 
«protection of linguistic minorities» (Case No. 159/09, from which 
the following quotes are drawn), which “generates a model of 
division of powers between State and regions that does not correspond to 
the well-known categories applicable to all other matters under Title V of 
the Constitution, both before and after the constitutional amendment of 
2001”. 
On the one hand, “the state lawmaker appears to be holding the 
power to identify the protected minority languages, to determine the 
features of a linguistic minority to be protected, and the institutions that 
characterize this protection”; on the other hand, “the regional 
lawmaker is responsible for the further implementation of any state law 
that is necessary”. 
That power seems to resemble the power over matters of 
«scientific research»: in short, it is the regions’ concern to 
implement the state legislation in defense of a series of rights and 
constitutional values (but the limits implied can hardly be marked 
along the axis of the principle/implementation rule). 
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3.3. Matters with potentially defined content (enumerated 
and unenumerated) 
Next to these matters which variously contribute to inflate 
the matters listed in Const. Art. 117, par. 2 and 3, there are some 
with a more defined content, which do not lend themselves to 
being interpreted as cross-cutting or constrained in their 
respective fields because of the impact of state powers. 
These include matters of «professions» – in which one of 
the fundamental principles of State responsibility is also the 
identification of professionals (see 353/03 and 138/09 among 
others) – and «promotion and organization of cultural activities» – 
within which the responsibility of determining «actions in support 
of public entertainment» is brought (although for reasons of 
institutional continuity a state provision that regulated the 
relevant financial fund was then considered legitimate: 255/04). 
Similar considerations may be invoked for the «sports system 
regulation»: in Case No. 424 of 2004 the Court – excluding the 
relevance of other matters – listed under this label those powers 
relating to the regulation of facilities and sports equipment. The 
interpretive development of the «ports and airports» matter seems 
to lead to the same conclusion: the focus is less on identifying the 
contents of responsibility (which “is mainly concerned with facilities 
and their geographical location”, 51/08), than on finding modes of 
cooperation between State and regions. 
A phenomenon identical to that described for the «road 
traffic» occurs, under concurrent powers, in two subject matters 
not listed in Art. 117: «building amnesty» and «land reclamation 
boards». In both cases – except for criminal law infractions of the 
building amnesty regulation – the Constitutional Court brings 
these matters within concurrent regional powers, mainly in the 
area of «territorial government», thus confirming its typically 
«expansive» capacity: however, it should be noted that, once 
again, the fact that a matter is not listed does not prevent it from 
being assigned to a level of power other than the residual 
legislative power of the Region. 
 
 
3.4. Matters that can hardly be regulated by regions 
Finally, a few words about some powers that, apparently 
almost by mistake, have been added to (we’d better say, have 
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fallen within) concurrent powers. This statement is not motivated 
by a desire to be controversial, but by the fact that the 
constitutional judicial review that has dealt with these matters has 
often made use of interpretive tools to warrant centralization. 
The most striking example is provided by «national 
production, transportation and distribution of energy»: if we 
looked at Cases No. 6 of 2004, Nos. 336 and 383 of 2005 in 
particular, we would realize that, with the only exception of those 
aspects – also very difficult to identify – which connect the 
mentioned matter to planning and, consequently, to «territorial 
government», the regional level is not structurally prepared to 
regulate the sector in question, especially in terms of 
implementation rules: the Court repeatedly said that technical 
regulations and, more generally, the guarantee of a uniform set of 
rules shall be considered the responsibility of the State. The 
regions, on the legislative front, are left with very little or nothing 
at all (as evidenced by Case No. 103 of 2006). 
In this perspective, it is hardly relevant that state powers 
are ensured by resorting to the «subsidiarity principle» (Case No. 
383 of 2005) or by extending, through interpretation, the scope of 
the fundamental principles (Cases No. 336 of 2005, No. 129 of 
2006). 
Much the same can be said of «rules of communication»: 
Cases No. 336 of 2005, Nos. 103 and 265 in 2006 (although the line 
of cases actually begins with Cases Nos. 307 and 331 of 2003) 
made it clear – e.g., with regard to ensuring a unified procedure 
for authorizing mobile telephony installations – that the regional 
role, at the administrative implementation stage, is limited to 
executing national rules (which in turn «execute» the Community 
law) 30. 
 
 
4. Residual powers 
4.1. The problematic nature and workability of the 
residual policy 
The residual policy has not found «widespread» 
application in constitutional judicial review. 
                                                           
30 Nevertheless, see the latest Case, No. 255 of 2010, in which the Constitutional 
Court seemed to outline a possible framework for regional intervention. 
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Already in Case No. 370 of 2003, which formalizes the use 
of the prevalence criterion, it is stated that the residual policy does 
not work mechanically and does not operate automatically: “in 
general, we also need say that it is impossible to refer a particular subject 
of legislation to the application area within the residual powers of the 
Regions under the fourth paragraph of Art. 117, by the mere fact that 
this subject is not immediately attributable to any of the matters listed in 
the second and third paragraphs of Const. Art. 117”. 
Apparently, this claim – in so far as it does not correspond 
to an inevitable consequential logic, by which it is obvious that 
some legislative regulations are part of the matters listed in art. 
117, although they do not reproduce the exact header – seems to 
debase the major innovation introduced with the new Art. 117: 
residual policy, and the relevant reversed policy ensuing from the 
enumeration of state powers31. 
In other words, such a statement of principle – which is 
duly reflected in subsequent cases – makes it ordinary to refer 
(national) legislative regulations – which would more likely be 
ranked under the «unenumerated» matters – to individual titles 
under the exclusive power of the State or regional concurrent 
powers, while it makes it exceptional to assign them to residual 
powers (as a result of an interpretive process that can go as far as to 
attributing a matter to the regional residual powers only after 
unfailingly excluding any link to other «enumerated» matters). It 
is therefore at the level of the interpretive process that the spirit 
(and substance) of Art. 117 are fully mitigated. 
In this sense, the recent case of «dematerialization» and 
subsequent «re-materialization» of the responsibility in matters of 
«public housing» acquires significance: in continuity with 
previous constitutional judicial review (starting from Case No. 221 
of 1975 and in respect of all subsequent decisions), the Court 
derived the tripartite division of the matter at issue from an old 
decision, and dismembered the matter – after acknowledging its 
«cross-cuttingness», obviously not in the “classical” sense – to 
finally recompose it using existing titles, so that it partly falls 
within the «essential service levels», partly within the «territorial 
government», and partly within the residual powers. 
                                                           
31 However, it had warned about the uselessness of residual policy in 
strengthening regional powers, S. Mangiameli, Riforma federale, luoghi comuni e 
realtà costituzionale, in 4 Le Reg. 517 et seq. (1997). 
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The interesting fact is that the judicial review process that 
the Court chose as the basis for its decision, which was completed 
before the constitutional amendment, concluded with a reference 
to Case No. 27 of 1996, which clearly affirmed that the regions had 
«plena cognitio»,  “in matters of public housing, both administratively 
and legislatively (because of the similarity in functions), so that we could 
consider that a ‘new’ matter under regional powers has taken shape in 
the development of the judicial system which goes beyond the initial 
reconstruction made with Case No. 221 of 1975 – public housing in fact 
– and has achieved its own consistency regardless of its reference to 
urban planning and public works” (Case No. 27 of 1996, in the 
passage drawn from Case No. 94 of 2007). 
Now, as the residual policy had been called into action – at 
least in this case in which the new matter had been “certified” by 
the Constitutional Court itself – we would have expected full 
regional knowledgability, to paraphrase the Court. Contrary to all 
expectations, the Court «materialized» public housing in a new 
way with the aim of holding back to the state what it would 
otherwise have lost (as it was no longer to be referred to 
concurrent powers). 
It must therefore be stressed how important continuity of 
“results” and the protection of national instances are in 
constitutional jurisprudence, and how heavily vesting the regions 
with new, truly residual powers is affected by these dynamics. 
In essence, also this results in a relational model of powers 
and, in this perspective, the residual policy turns out to be twice as 
residual: the residuality introduced in the legal system with Art. 
117, par. 4, as interpreted by the Constitutional Court, actually is 
«second-order residuality».  
In order for a residual power to be acknowledged, it is not 
enough that a matter is not listed in paragraphs 2 and 3 of Art. 117 
(i.e. the requirements of Art. 117, par. 4). It must also be ruled out, 
as a matter of interpretation, that the unenumerated matter can be 
referred to, and therefore be part of, other enumerated legislative 
matters.  
It can be concluded that the residual matter is what remains 
after excluding other enumerated powers in the subsumption (as 
shown in the decision regarding public housing). 
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4.2. In search of truly residual powers 
However, that has not prevented – given the circumstances 
– a number of truly residual regional powers from being identified 
over the past fifty years. 
The Court recognized that matters such as agriculture; 
handicrafts; trade; social assistance and social services; mountain 
community services boards; education and vocational training 
(which is the only somehow «enumerated» matter, because it is 
expressly excluded from concurrent powers in matters of 
“education, except the autonomy of educational institutions and 
with the exception of education and vocational training"); regional 
public employment; regional office regulation; fisheries; local 
public services and tourism should be considered under regional 
residual power32. 
In fact, it should be noted that residual regional powers 
embody the “Cinderella” of the system of legislative powers: 
many of the powers recognized as such suffer the impact of cross-
cutting matters, of the reference to national interests, of the ever-
applicable «subsidiarity principle», the impact of the «prevalence 
criterion – principle of loyal cooperation – historic-regulatory 
policy» triptych, the expansion of the fundamental principles as 
seen before (which may also affect residual powers), and the 
operation of the principle of institutional continuity (as is the case 
with handicraft: Case No. 162 of 2005). 
All these elements of flexibility, paradoxically, while 
introducing fuzziness in the scope of the matters listed in Art. 117, 
in one way or another, end up referring the legislative regulations 
under review by the Court to one of the numerous tags contained 
in Art. 117, par. 2 and 3, thus setting a limit to the role of the 
residual clause. 
 
 
5. Models and tools to harmonize the system of 
legislative powers 
At this point, after providing what we hope is a sufficiently 
articulated, and realistic, description of an objectively complex 
system, we can now analyze the tools that the Constitutional 
                                                           
32 Refer to http:/www.dirittoregionale.it/ for a list of the decisions on each 
matter. 
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Court used for the «judicial construction of law»33, meant to 
harmonize the system of legislative powers, i.e. to make it 
sustainable. 
We will therefore go through a set of tools that we have 
already discussed above and will now be briefly described and 
explained. 
In the last section we will retrace the patterns of 
relationships between legislative powers endorsed by the 
Constitutional Court. 
 
 
5.1. Institutional continuity 
The tool we should analyze first is the so-called 
«institutional continuity». It should be treated first as it clearly 
shows how difficult it is to confer new powers to the regions in the 
context of an organizational system of the state – in the broad 
sense in which it was discussed earlier – which has not yet been 
adjusted to the new legislative powers that are vested in the 
regions as per Art. 117. 
This inevitably resulted in the previously existing system 
being perpetuated. The reasons for failing to adjust have already 
been mentioned, but it is worth resuming them briefly. 
First of all, the little or no weight given to Title V by the 
state lawmaker (particularly in those legislative acts which are 
fundamental for the life of the State, such as budget laws). 
Secondly, the need for implementing a constitutional 
reform designed to make the functions allocated by the state 
legislation – in particular by the so-called Bassanini reforms – 
“readable”, starting from the wording of the amended Articles 117 
and 118, and not vice versa, as has been the case so far. 
By all appearances, these two aspects are interlinked, and 
immediately recall a third one: the issue of the financial autonomy 
of the Regions (particularly) and of the implementation of Article 
119 of the Constitution. 
In other words, the interaction of three factors (the practice 
of state law, the lack of legislative as well as financial 
implementation of constitutional amendments) led to a recurrent 
situation before the Constitutional Court, in respect of which it has 
                                                           
33 See L.Califano (ed.), La costruzione giurisprudenziale delle fonti del diritto (2010). 
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sometimes had to adopt specific remedies involving a significant 
sacrifice for the legal (financial and administrative) independence 
of the regions. 
The Constitutional Court recognized, for instance, that 
«school organization» (Case No. 13 of 2004) or «actions in support 
of public entertainment» (Case No. 255 of 2004) fall under regional 
responsibility in matters of «education» and «promotion and 
organization of cultural activities».  
However, the Court itself, in the latter decision, took charge 
of focusing on the specifics of the problem and recognized 
«effectiveness» to this regional power (although only 
theoretically); in the case before the Court, in fact, the 
acknowledged regional power corresponded to a state law 
establishing the criteria and procedures for funding entertainment 
activities and the annual distribution rates for the Entertainment 
Fund, which inevitably had previously been established, regulated 
and governed centrally. The Constitutional Court said that “what 
we have before us is most evidently the unavoidable necessity for the state 
lawmaker to significantly review the existing laws – which in cases like 
this can hardly be modified by regional lawmakers – in this area, as in all 
similar areas which have become a regional matter under the third 
paragraph of Article 117 of the Constitution but are still characterized by 
a centralized procedure, in order to meet the evolving constitutional 
framework”. 
In the case in point, the Constitutional Court added that 
this was the result of “the difficulties caused by the missing 
transitional provisions – in Constitutional Law, No. 3 (...) of October 18, 
2001 –designed to govern the transition in those matters where a change 
of ownership between State and regions had taken place and especially 
where – as in this case – a changeover is necessary from a legislation 
regulating centralized procedures to forms of management of the 
administrative action that are centered on the regions, but where the 
current legislation cannot be effectively reviewed directly by regional 
laws alone”. Thus, it concluded that “in view of this exceptional 
situation supplementing Act No. 163 of 1985, while its temporary 
application can be justified, it is clear that this regulatory system cannot 
be justified further in the future”. 
Case No. 13 of 2004 provides a similar and even clearer 
example as it identifies the stakes raised and remedies adopted by 
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the Court: in this case the effectiveness of regional prerogatives is 
caught in a sort of «pincer movement».  
After acknowledging the state lawmaker’s intrusion into 
regional legislative power, the Court affirmed that “the immediate 
repeal of the censored paragraph 3 of Article 22 (…) would lead (…) to 
effects (…) which are incompatible with the Constitution. Education 
service delivery is linked to fundamental human rights (…). This results 
in the obvious need for continuity in the delivery of the education service 
(…), which is an essential public service”. 
It follows that “the principle of continuity that this Court has 
already recognized to be working on the legislative level, (…) must now 
be expanded to meet the needs of institutional continuity, since – 
especially in a Constitutional State – the system does not live on rules 
and regulations only, but also on institutions aimed at guaranteeing 
fundamental rights. In matters of education, the preservation of this 
feature is imposed by irreducible constitutional values. The type of 
decision that this Court is called upon to take is suggested, in short, by 
the joint need of complying with the division of constitutional powers 
and assuring continuity of the education service. Article 22, paragraph 3 
of Act No. 448 of 2001 shall thus continue to operate until each 
individual region will be equipped with the regulations and institutional 
apparatus capable of performing the function needed to distribute 
teachers among schools within its territory according to the timing and 
mode necessary to avoid disrupting the service, inconveniencing students 
and staff, and causing shortages in the operation of the educational 
institutions.” 
In this way, therefore, the distribution of the administrative 
functions mandated by the existing legislation in relation to the 
constitutional review, the lack of implementation of Article 11934  
and the principle of institutional continuity coalesce at the expense 
of regional autonomy. 
As a matter of fact, premising the specific legislative powers 
vested in the State (unlawfully after the amendment to Title V) in 
matters that may have an impact on the exercise of fundamental 
rights, how can the yet existing regional power ever be 
acknowledged if, in order to effectively exercise it, the  Regions 
                                                           
34 On this matter, the concept of «suspended financial constitution» is 
introduced by A. Morrone, Corte costituzionale e «costituzione finanziaria», in A. 
Pace (ed.), Corte costituzionale e processo costituzionale nell’esperienza della rivista 
«Giurisprudenza costituzionale» per il cinquantesimo anniversario (2006), 624 et seq. 
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must not only adopt ad hoc regulations, but also set up institutions 
that can handle them, without resorting to additional resources 
(because of the failing implementation of Article 119)? 
Clearly, in these cases the system essentially stalls, as it 
meets, on the one hand, the regulatory void left by the non-
implemented new Article 119 of the Constitution, and the 
principles determining the adequacy of funds related with the 
exercise of the powers conferred to each local authority involved, 
and, on the other hand, the need to ensure continuity in the 
services that affect citizens’ fundamental rights. 
These are the reasons behind the decisions – in all but rare 
instances – that adopt the principle of institutional continuity, by 
virtue of which, while clearly acknowledging the regional 
authority and the lack of national authority over rules and 
regulations imposed by the State, these are kept effective to 
prevent infringement of fundamental rights35. 
Incidentally: the question remains open as to the way in 
which “the region can give proof of being in possession of the 
administrative apparatus capable of ensuring continuity of 
service, thus fulfilling the condition precedent imposed by the 
Court to the exercise of their powers”36. 
Based on all of the above considerations, the Constitutional 
Court appears to be powerless when confronted with such cases. 
Rather than arguing that, under these circumstances, the 
constitutional case law concerning the pending implementation of 
Article 119 of the Constitution is far from being effective and that 
after all it lets the state lawmaker live a quiet life, it should be 
noted that both the effects of (any) declarations of 
unconstitutionality, and the Court’s position in the constitutional 
system suggest that the only agent who can set the conditions that 
                                                           
35 It is interesting to note, incidentally, how the Constitutional Court’s 
approach, in these cases, refers to some kind of internal hierarchy of 
constitutional provisions, according to which the constitutional guarantee of a 
right (and of the continuity of the administrative structures that will allow that 
right to be guaranteed) prevails over other constitutional provisions conferring 
legislative powers. 
36 As noted by L. Violini, La riforma del regionalismo italiano e gli orientamenti della 
Corte costituzionale: casi e percorsi interpretativi, in E. Bindi, M. Perini (ed.), 
Federalismo e regionalismo. Teoria e prassi nell’attuale fase storica (2006), 27. 
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make it possible to exercise regional powers is the Parliament, not 
the Constitutional Court through its decisions. 
Sometimes the Court has been more explicit: to this regard, 
reasonable seems the reading of those who pointed out that the 
Constitutional Court maintains two different attitudes toward the 
declaration of unconstitutionality of the fixed funds established by 
the State in matters of regional legislative power. 
When people’s «rights» are being questioned, the Court 
tends to keep them alive by referring to the principle of 
institutional continuity (reference is made to Cases No. 50/08 and 
No. 10/2010 concerning the well-known «social card», in which the 
Court stated that “the need for continuity, already considered by this 
Court operative on the regulatory and institutional level (Case No. 13 of 
2004), may also be invoked in relation to a scheme intended to ensure a 
fundamental right, as the need to properly protect irrepressible 
constitutional values requires us to prevent, where possible, 
interruptions capable of violating it"). 
In other cases, instead – for instance, Cases Nos. 16 and 49 
of 2004 – when the problem of financial autonomy purely arose as 
a conflict of powers between levels of government that would not 
(immediately) involve fundamental rights, the Court did not 
hesitate to develop a clear case of censorship of that State practice. 
For present purposes, we must conclude that the lack of 
legislative – but more specifically institutional – implementation 
of the constitutional amendment implies that, in significant areas 
currently assigned to the regional legislative authority, and 
expressly recognized as such by the Constitutional Court, the 
relevant legislative and regulatory power is stripped from the 
regions. 
 
 
5.2. The concurrence of powers: the prevalence criterion 
and the principle of loyal cooperation 
«Concurrence of powers» is a synthetic, but effective 
proposition (used by the Constitutional Court in Case No. 50/05) 
that refers to a different hypothesis than the one dealt with above. 
Generally speaking, it refers to the frequent cases of 
"intertwining" of legislative powers taking place within a unified 
regulatory body, such that it cannot be solved by identifying a 
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clear boundary between the legislative powers of the State and the 
Regions. 
To resolve these (theoretically) anomalous but (practically) 
recurrent cases of overlapping powers, the Constitutional Court 
has identified at least two criteria: the prevalence criterion and the 
principle of loyal cooperation. 
This approach, besides being constantly practiced by the 
Court, it has also been theorized in Case No. 231 of 2005, as the 
principal issue: “the complexity of the social reality to be governed 
entails that legislative acts cannot often be attributed to a single subject 
matter as a whole, because they concern non-homogeneous positions 
covered by quite different matters in terms of legislative powers (matters 
within the exclusive powers of the State and matters within the residual 
regional power, matters within the exclusive powers of the State and 
matters of concurrent powers). In such cases of concurrent powers this 
Court has applied the prevalence criterion and the principle of loyal 
cooperation, based on the peculiarities of the intertwining acts (Cases No. 
370 of 2003 and No. 50 of 2005). Accordingly, in order to identify the 
matter(s) which relate to the censored provisions, the historical-
systematic context to which they belong must be taken into account”. 
As can be seen, to the two criteria set forth the Court also 
added the reference to the «historical-systematic context», which 
actually, in judicial review, could as well be interpreted as 
«historical-regulatory criterion». 
If we look at the operating dynamic of the criteria laid 
down by the Court, we realize that, ultimately, all three – which 
also run on very different plans – end up “justifying” the 
resumption of power by the State. 
The historical-regulatory criterion is used by the Court as a 
solid bridge to current legislation (which ultimately favors the 
crystallization of the legislation in force until the constitutional 
reform and even after it, as we have seen in relation to the 
changed interpretive paradigm of the matters “competition 
protection” and “environmental protection”). 
The prevalence criterion, wisely adopted along with state 
powers to dictate principles in matters of concurrent powers and 
used, in any case, to prevent unenumerated matters from “falling” 
into the category of regional residual responsibility, ends up 
promoting the total or partial assignment of the interpreted 
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matters to the state powers (evaluating the ratio of the legislative 
intervention). 
The principle of loyal cooperation is the seal of this type of 
relational model of the legislative powers and seems to lead to the 
conclusion that, when the region is «stripped» of a power 
apparently given by the Constitution, it should be allowed to the 
decision sharing process connected to the implementation of state 
regulations. 
The degree (opinion, weak or strong consent) and level 
(single region, the State-Regions Conference, Joint Conference) of 
the regional partaking based on the principle of loyal cooperation 
is the result of an essentially judicial assessment of the 
Constitutional Court (at least when legislative predetermination of 
agreed procedures is missing or considered insufficient). 
Glancing through the case history, it seems that the 
intensity of the cooperation permitted by the Court depends upon 
some sort of sub-decision about the priority of matters based on 
the constitutional significance of the interests at stake (of which, 
however,  the reference to legislative matters is usually an 
expression) or on the status of legislation – occurring particularly 
when powers concur in establishing or refinancing state funds 
affecting regional matters, which cannot sometimes not imply – 
except for complex reform movements – the exercise of State 
legislative power: if the contested law is more (as compared to 
other powers, otherwise the prevalence criterion would be 
applied) to be referred to residual or concurrent powers, then the 
cooperation will be stronger, while in the opposite case it will be 
realized in milder, mainly advisory procedures. 
For instance, in a recent case (Case No. 51/08) of power 
concurrence in matters of airport regulation in which the overlap 
was between «civil regulation», «competition protection» 
(exclusive state powers) and «airports», «territorial government», 
«large transportation networks» (concurrent powers), in 
consideration of “the existing connections and intertwinings”, the 
opinion of the Joint Conference (to be acquired before the CIPE’s – 
Interministerial Economic Planning Committee’s – decision 
expected in the contested provisions) was considered sufficient. 
In the preceding case (Nr. 50/08, but see also Nr. 168/09), 
the regions had challenged certain provisions of the Finance Act of 
2007 which governed the purpose of use of the Fund for family 
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policies. The Court recognized that “the overall and unified purpose 
which is meant to be achieved through the examined paragraphs is 
embodied in the provision of social policy interventions”, thus 
establishing the reference to regional residual power in matters of 
«social services». 
However, the Constitutional Court also stated that the 
contested provisions contained “additional specific purposes” which 
could be referred to the exclusive powers of the state. 
It concluded, “taking into account the unitary and indivisible 
nature of the Fund at issue”, in favor of the firm application of the 
principle of loyal cooperation consisting in – given the “nature of 
the interests involved” – the (additional) expectation of the 
necessary, preliminary consent of the Joint Conference before 
adoption of the decree concerning the distribution of the 
ministerial Fund for Family Services.  
There is, therefore, a certain connection between the 
«burdensome» intrusion of the State and the model of loyal 
cooperation chosen by the Constitutional Court, which reveals a 
tendency to use «compensatory» consent procedures when 
concurrence of powers cannot be solved in terms of priority. 
It should be noted that the concurrence of powers (with its 
decisive criteria) is the general model for resolving overlapping 
state and regional powers, but the Constitutional Court has 
expressly rejected its application in relation to the cross-cutting 
matters «environmental protection» and «competition protection» 
(to which what has already been said applies). 
 
 
5.3. «Subsidiarity principle» (and some details about the 
ambiguous role of the principle of loyal cooperation) 
The best known – yet not the most widely used – means 
adopted by the Constitutional Court to harmonize the system of 
legislative powers is certainly what the Constitutional Court has 
identified as the «subsidiarity principle»37. 
Since the celebrated Case No. 303 of 2003, the Court has 
acknowledged that the division of powers prescribed in Const. 
Art. 117, can be partly repealed, letting the state resume the 
                                                           
37 For further details, see G. Scaccia, Sussidiarietà istituzionale e poteri statali di 
unificazione normativa (2009). 
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legislative regulation of administrative functions which, although 
assigned to the responsibility of the regions at the legislative level, 
the regions are not equipped to manage and regulate. 
Therefore, under the principle of legality – which requires a 
legislative framework of the administrative activity – if the 
responsibility is “upgraded” because of the principle of 
subsidiarity (and adequacy) as per Art. 118, par. 1, also the level of 
legislative responsibility must rise, which means that it will be 
transferred from the regional level to the state level. 
The point is that the Court, feeling the overwhelming scope 
of the decision, tried to mark its limits by requiring that the right 
of subsidiarity should be supported by an underlying public 
interest actually proportionate to the legislative measure adopted, 
should not be characterized by “unreasonableness as in a close 
scrutiny of constitutionality” and, above all, should be “object of an 
agreement with the region concerned”. 
Apart from the criteria of «proportionality» and 
«reasonableness» (which in the constitutional judicial review of 
regional interest are likely to be essentially evanescent or easily 
adaptable according to contingent needs), this partially enigmatic 
claim of the need for an agreement with the region concerned left 
open the question on the necessity that the agreement had to be 
prior or subsequent to the state’s legislative intervention «in 
subsidiarity». The case law that followed implied that the 
agreement may be subsequent (Case No. 6 of 2004), but also 
confirmed that, basically, when the subsidiarity principle is 
invoked, consent should be “strong”. 
In fact, the point falls short of the degree of clarity that 
would be desirable, both in terms of regional involvement, and in 
terms of the overall assessment of the better or worse “direction” 
taken in the subsidiarity practice in relation to the previous limits 
to regional autonomy38. 
Looking at the cases from a general point of view, we can 
observe that the subsidiarity principle plays a partly «subsidiary» 
role in relation to the «concurrence of powers» resolved with the 
use of the principle of loyal cooperation (see preceding 
paragraph), often with similar procedural consequences. If the 
                                                           
38 See remarks by A. Ruggeri, Leggi statali e leggi regionali alla ricerca di una nuova 
identità, in 1-2 Quad. reg. 401 et seq. (2007).  
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Court is not faced with such an intertwining of powers that would 
fully justify state legislation, after judging the interest underlying 
the state’s legislative intervention, it can still confer power to the 
state on the base of subsidiarity, while deciding the necessary 
level of cooperation (as the degree is generally that of a strong 
consent with respect to acts of implementation of the legislation 
adopted by the State after application of the subsidiarity 
principle). 
From another perspective, a certain way of understanding 
the role of «loyal cooperation»39 helps to factually overcome the 
division of powers set out in Article 117: the Court stated that “the 
principle of loyal cooperation shall regulate all relationships between 
State and Regions: its flexibility and its adaptability make it particularly 
suitable to dynamically regulate the relationships at issue, reducing any 
dualism and avoiding rigidity. However, the vagueness of this parameter, 
if useful for the reasons stated above, requires constant clarification and 
factual underpinnings. These can be legislative, administrative or 
judicial” (No. 31/06). 
In that respect, “one of the most qualified agents to formulate 
rules designed to complement the parameter of the loyal cooperation is 
currently the system consisting of State-Regions Conferences and local 
authorities” where “the dialogue takes place between the two large 
regulatory systems of the Republic, following which agreed solutions to 
controversial issues can be identified”. 
The Court continued by underlining that the principle of 
loyal cooperation “requires parties to sign – in an institutional setting 
– an official agreement to abide by their commitment. Realizing the 
parameter of loyal cooperation through the agreements in the State-
Regions Conference is also more consistent with the constitutional 
system of self-government, since it privileges a horizontal (collegiate) 
view rather than a vertical (hierarchical) view of mutual relationships”. 
However, the Court, also in order to give account of the 
non perfectly linear trend of case law on the issue40, made it clear 
on the one hand (Case No. 63/06) that collaborative procedures 
cannot derogate from the constitutional division of powers (thus 
                                                           
39 See the reconstruction provided by da R. Bifulco, Leale collaborazione (principio 
di), in S. Cassese (ed.), Dizionario di diritto pubblico (2006), 3356 et seq. 
40 See A. Carminati, Dal raccordo politico al vincolo giuridico: l’attività della 
Conferenza Stato-Regioni secondo il giudice costituzionale, in 2 Le Reg. 257 et seq. 
(2009).    
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strongly limiting the theories – and practices – that are pressing 
for a substantial contract system of legislative powers), and on the 
other hand (Case No. 378/05) that collaborative procedures can be 
overcome when there is a need to respond quickly to essential 
public interests. 
In any case, a number of issues of constitutional legitimacy 
raised by the regions with regard to the breach of the principle of 
loyal cooperation were found groundless by the Court (No. 
387/07), which affirmed that “this principle cannot be invoked, as a 
requirement of constitutional legitimacy, with regard to the exercise of 
legislative power, since no constitutional basis can be identified for the 
obligation to adopt collaborative procedures designed to influence that 
power (ex plurimis, Cases No. 98 of 2007, No. 133 2006, No. 31 of 2005 
and No. 196 of 2004)”41. 
As mentioned above, frequently, when the Court is faced 
with budget laws containing provisions regulating funds in 
matters of regional concern that are likely to extend the scope of 
matters of state concern or the scope of fundamental principles, or 
that resort to the concept of «concurrence of powers» or the 
«subsidiary clause», the result is not a blunt declaration of 
unconstitutionality, but the so-called «cooperation-additive» 
decision with which the Court rules that the Regions (normally 
through the conference system) shall be involved during the 
implementation of those provisions42. 
Furthermore, recent rulings by the Constitutional Court on 
the cross-cutting matters «environmental protection» and 
«competition protection» (broadly bordering with – or rather, 
encroaching on – regional responsibilities) clarified that 
collaborative procedures do not extend to matters of exclusive 
state concern, even if cross-cutting (unless the state lawmaker 
provides them spontaneously). 
                                                           
41 On the other hand, in Case No. 24 of 2007, the principle of «loyal 
cooperation» was dilated to the extent that consent to determine the learning 
profiles of professional apprenticeship was deemed necessary not only between 
levels of government (even overlapping or concurring in the exercise of the 
same function or power), but also between a regional council and employers’ 
and trade union organizations. 
42 See R. Cherchi, I. Ruggiu, «Effettività» e «seguito» della giurisprudenza 
costituzionale sul principio di leale collaborazione tra Stato e Regioni, in R. Bin, G. 
Brunelli, A. Pugiotto, P. Veronesi (ed.), «Effettività» e «seguito» delle tecniche 
decisorie della Corte costituzionale (2006), 365 et seq. 
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In this regard, it is worth noting that most of the 
cooperative procedures introduced by the Court or the extensive 
references to the conference system will end up vesting the State 
with the power to «coordinate» where it would not have the 
power to «regulate» in spite of the fact, however, that no similar 
(obviously non-specular) process is found in favor of the Regions, 
at least with reference to the cross-sectoral powers that affect, by 
definition, the cross-cutting matters assigned to them by the 
Constitution. 
In this perspective, the line of case law (well supported in 
theory) which has greatly expanded the use of additive or 
substitutive decisions «of collaboration» (with the various possible 
formulas), while, at the technical-judicial level, it has “used the 
most invasive tool at disposal”43, at the level of the relations 
between state and regional powers, it seems not to have 
overplayed its hand, by not using – for understandable reasons, 
given the structural weaknesses in the implementation of the 
constitutional amendment from the various and often cited 
viewpoints – the key tool in its hands: the declaration of 
unconstitutionality due to the state’s intrusion into regional 
legislative powers. 
 
 
5.4. From judicial case law to models of separation and 
distribution of legislative powers  
In conclusion, it may be useful to summarize the 
framework for harmonization of the system of state and regional 
legislative powers that emerge from the analysis conducted so far. 
In principle, the Constitutional Court consistently held that 
the identification of the matter to which a number of legislative 
and statutory provisions must be ascribed “should be related to the 
subject and requirements of the provisions, taking into account their 
purpose and ignoring marginal aspects and induced effects, so as to 
properly identify and fully protect their interest (Cases No. 430, No. 169 
and No. 165 of 2007)” (168/09). 
1) In this context, we can proceed to analyze, first, the 
placement of state exclusive powers compared to concurrent or 
residual regional powers. 
                                                           
43 See R. Cherchi, I. Ruggiu, «Effettività» e «seguito», ditto, 381. 
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Exclusive state powers (in brief, without much accuracy) 
are of two types: either cross-cutting (and potentially cross-
cutting) or with potentially defined content (even though 
unenumerated). 
All can lead to overlapping powers. 
With regard to regional powers, the former relate to each of 
them in a peculiar way (special reference is made to «ESL», 
«criminal justice system», and «civil regulation»).  
On the other hand, important similarities can be pointed 
out that concern «environmental protection» and «competition 
protection», as described. 
As for the other exclusive legislative powers of the state, 
instances of overlap (or involvement) are resolved on the basis of 
three criteria: 
a) first, with the criteria typical of the concurrence of powers, 
i.e., as the Constitutional Court has recently stated, by conferring 
powers as follows: “in the event that a regulatory provision is at the 
crossroads of different subject matters, assigned by the Constitution to 
the legislative powers of both State and Regions, the prevailing field of 
application must be identified. And if such a field of application cannot 
be identified, in the absence of criteria contained in the Constitution, the 
concurrence of powers comes into play and justifies the application of the 
principle of loyal cooperation (Case No. 50 of 2008), which is anyway 
expected to permeate the relations between the state and the system of 
local self-governments” (No. 168/09). 
In reality, both the prevalence criterion and the principle of 
loyal cooperation – in case law – are closely linked to the 
historical-regulatory criterion, namely the context of interests as 
dealt with and settled in the legal system (usually based on State 
regulation) or the regulatory «context» in which the legislative act 
is situated. 
More realistic is therefore – even with respect to the 
statement cited at the beginning of the paragraph – the following 
statement of the Constitutional Court (concerning both the 
identification of legislative matters, and the resolution of a case of 
overlapping legislative powers): “The decision about these issues 
implies prior identification of the matter to which the legislative act at 
issue is to be related, having regard to the object and the rules determined 
by the contested provisions, taking into account their purpose, the 
objectives it proposes to pursue, the context in which it was adopted, and 
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identifying the interest served”(excerpt drawn from Case No. 
10/2010); 
b) through the principle of institutional continuity, which 
recognizes the abstract regulatory power of the regions, but also 
highlights the inadequacy of the regional apparatus (regulations, 
facilities and equipment) designed to rule and administer it. In 
these cases, in particular if the validity of state legislation implies 
the continuity of the protection of fundamental rights, the state 
law is not declared unconstitutional; 
c) through the «subsidiary clause», according to which the 
regulation of indivisible administrative powers is resumed by the 
central level. In this case, collaborative procedures between State 
and regions should normally be provided for in the exercise of 
these powers. 
Both in the context of the «subsidiary clause», and in the 
context of the concurrence of powers resolved through the 
principle of loyal cooperation, it was stressed that this principle – 
which in itself would be geared to enhancing the regional level – 
ends up in practice as a compensatory measure to make up for the 
loss of legislative powers that both harmonization models entail 
for the regional self-government. 
In other words, if we look closely at the practical realization 
of both the «subsidiary clause» and the concurrence of powers 
(when it is resolved through consent), we note that both these 
tools have a «side effect» on regional self-government. 
While they carve out a role for the region or, more 
frequently, for their «system of representation» at the central 
powers, at the same time they significantly reduce the margin of 
«individual choice» given to each of them (by the Constitution). 
In this way, the regions (or rather the regional system) 
actually manage to reach a level of sharing in decisions concerning 
the use of resources or the exercise of administrative functions (to 
manage or co-manage), but each of them immediately loses a good 
portion of their legislative independence both with respect to the 
state, and as compared to the possibility of distinguishing their 
choices from those of other regions – which, as we might guess, is 
the true essence of regional self-government. 
2) Within the domain of concurrent powers it was noted 
that the concept of fundamental principle is either elusive, or 
should be declined by each matter, considering that the self-
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classification of a state rule as a « fundamental principle» is 
irrelevant in itself. 
The internal implementation of Community law may lead 
to a unique modulation and, de facto, an extension of the 
normative scope of the fundamental principles (at the expense of 
regional powers). The state legislation implementing Community 
law may contain a pliable implementation rule (which means it 
can be replaced by rules established by the regional lawmaker). 
Within the domain of concurrent powers we have analyzed 
some matters in which the Court admitted, for various reasons, 
that the state legislation was not exclusively limited to 
fundamental principles (scientific research and financial 
coordination, in particular). 
We have also described a number of concurrent matters 
that we have defined «matters that can hardly be regulated by 
regions» in the sense that they usually give rise to decisions of the 
Constitutional Court to ensure a unified, national, regulatory 
framework in those areas, either because there are unified state 
regulations, or because unified technical standards are required. 
As regards state and regional powers overlapping, what 
has previously been said applies. 
3) Finally, with regard to regional residual powers it was 
verified that the prevalence criterion ultimately gives rise to what 
has been called «second-order residuality»: that is, residual 
powers (Art. 117, par. 4) only attract those matters that cannot be 
considered part of an enumerated power, based on an assessment 
of priority. 
As was anticipated, and as summarized here, we can easily 
verify that the system of state and regional legislative powers 
operates quite differently from what we could theoretically 
imagine by reading Article 117. 
In this area, we cannot but confirm the difficulty, as was the 
case under the term of the previous Article 117, in having the 
constitutional text effectively regulate the relationships between 
state law and regional law. Figuring out the solutions to these 
issues is not within the scope of this work. 
 
 
